



Daily Report

East Europe

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Yugoslavia

International—TANJUG reports that the command staff of the UN peacekeeping force in Yugoslavia received reinforcements. "Twenty officers from Sweden landed in Belgrade and continued at once for Sarajevo, the site of the peace operation's headquarters."

A reconnaissance-operational group headed by Kenyan Army Brigadier-General Arab Rob arrived in Knin and "Indian Army General Satish Nambiar, the commander of the peacekeeping force, together with 34 UN officers today flew from Belgrade to Graz and thence to Zagreb by road."

Bosnia-Herzegovina—TANJUG reports the text of the document from the Brussels peace conference on the principles of the future constitutional system of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The document was forwarded by conference president Jose Cutilheiro and is entitled "Principles of the New Constitutional Organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Muslim and Croatian parties have "expressed readiness" to accept the document but the Serbian Democratic party has requested a "certain amount of time" to "consult" with its members on the text.

Albania

The Greek ambassador to Albania was summoned to the Foreign Ministry to receive a "note verbale" protesting "pamphlets in Greek containing open attempts to influence the electoral campaign...recently distributed in some districts of southern Albania," Tirana radio reports. The pamphlets "imbued with chauvinist and nationalist sentiments" are said to favor "candidates of certain parties" in the elections set for 22 March. The note also "expresses concern" about "anti-Albanian circles in Greece" and "inflammatory anti-Albanian propaganda" from a radio station based in Greece. The note says that the "Foreign Ministry hopes that the Greek Government will dissociate itself" from such activities.

Romania

President Ion Iliescu held a meeting with the leaders of political parties represented in the parliament to discuss "the future legislative and presidential elections," ROMPRES reports. The talks "did not end with a convergence of all opinions" on the "simultaneity of the parliamentary and presidential elections," but "the majority" agreed to hold legislative elections "no later than June." In an interview after the meeting broadcast by Bucharest radio, Iliescu said "it is necessary not to drag out" the date for the elections "too long." "Certainly the parliament will have to have its say," Iliescu said, "I believe we have to make these efforts and make possible the organization of these elections during the month of June."

Bulgaria

The Interior Ministry's press center has issued a warning on the "forthcoming mass protest actions" scheduled to "culminate in demonstrations" in Sofia on 14 March, BTA reports. The ministry notes that "some" of the "officers of the reserve" of the Defense and Interior Ministries "are among the most active organizers of the protest," which are "occasioned by the steps taken by the Ministry of Finance" regarding "the reversion of the state property of the DUMA Publishing House." The ministry "does not rule out the possibility of...clashes" posing "a real threat to social peace." The ministry notes "the competent authorities will take the necessary lawful measures." DUMA reports that the "order...for the confiscation" of the property of the publishing house was delivered on 5 March.

Greek 'Interference' in Elections Protested

*AU1003190692 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1830 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Statement issued by the Albanian Foreign Ministry in Tirana on 10 March]

[Text] Greek Ambassador Stylianos Mallikurtis was summoned to the Foreign Ministry today and handed a note verbale, which states that pamphlets in Greek containing open attempts to influence the electoral campaign have recently been distributed in some districts of southern Albania. This constitutes a flagrant interference in our internal affairs. These leaflets, which have been distributed illegally on the territory of Albania and are imbued with chauvinist and nationalist sentiments, call on Albanian citizens and those of Greek nationality in Albania and Greece to vote for the candidates of certain parties in the 22 March elections.

Such behavior is totally contrary to international practices and principles and the free expression of the desire of Albanian citizens to vote according to their political convictions.

The Albanian Foreign Ministry expresses its regret that Metropolitan Sevastianos, the signatory of these pamphlets, makes commitments on behalf of the Greek Government.

The note also expresses concern at recent similar activities among anti-Albanian circles in Greece, which are relying on Cold War-style propaganda and the brazen expression of territorial claims. The Free Voro Ipiros Radio Station operates near Albanian territory on Kerkyra, and carries daily Albanian and Greek-language programs that carry inflammatory anti-Albanian propaganda.

Expressing concern at these matters that threaten the relations of good neighborliness and understanding between our two countries, the Albanian Foreign Ministry hopes that the Greek Government will dissociate itself from such propaganda and behavior whose purpose is to upset relations between Albanians and the Greek minority.

Electoral Commission Notes Preparations for Vote

*AU1003180192 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1430 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Statement issued by Nikolla Nosi, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, in Tirana on 10 March—read by announcer]

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission is continuing to work on the conduct of the 22 March elections in conformity with the Electoral Law issued by the People's Assembly and in accordance with European and international standards. The Central Electoral Commission has received lists of parliamentary candidates from the constituencies and is examining their regularity. The documentation of 512 registered candidates has been examined so far. During this inquiry, documents found

to be irregular have been sent back to various constituencies for reconsideration. Eleven political organizations have presented their parliamentary candidates so far: the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Agrarian Party, the Human Rights Union, the Communist Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Popular Alliance Party, the Ecology Party, the Universal Party, and the Democratic Party in coalition with the Green Party in some constituencies. The average number of candidates for each constituency is five.

The Central Commission has recently been involved in setting up about 6,000 polling stations in cities, neighborhoods, regions, and villages and in compiling and announcing the electoral rolls as soon as possible. In the meantime, the Central Electoral Commission has taken every measure to ensure the necessary documentation for the 22 March elections, such as the electoral rolls, ballot papers, reports, ballot boxes, and the other materials. Despite efforts, there are still difficulties in ensuring telephone communication with all the constituencies.

Association for Free Elections Meets

*AU0903135892 Tirana ATA in English
1000 GMT 9 Mar 92*

[Text] Tirana, March 9 (ATA)—Recently, the Association for Free Elections and Democratic Culture, whose creation was adopted recently by the Ministry of Justice, held its first meeting in Tirana. Attending were representatives from its 19 branches created in the districts. Its members are intellectuals, students and workers who are not members of any political party.

The speech on the occasion was held by the chairman of the association, Mr. Zenel Spahiu who pointed out that we come from a totalitarian system where the people voted 99 per cent for the Party of Labour, without recognising the juridical norms. The voting process was simply a formality. We have a mission to make the people aware of their vote, because the next parliament, the government from which depends the destiny of democracy in Albania, will emerge from their votes. For the March 22 elections, the association will strive to have its observers in every polling centre in order to avoid the violations of the law, manipulations, as well as the fear and pressures that might be exerted on the electors.

Attending the meeting was also Mr. Thomas Melia, chairman of the delegation of the American Democratic Institution, as well as representatives from the Association for Free Elections and Civil Rights in Bulgaria and the Pro-Democracy Association in Romania.

Technical and procedural instructions were given at the meeting for covering the campaign and particularly during the day of elections.

Interior Ministry Warns Against Protest Actions

*AU1003205292 Sofia BTA in English
2030 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Sofia, March 10 (BTA)—The Ministry of the Interior holds information about forthcoming mass protest actions in Sofia from March 11 to 14, BTA learned from the Press Centre of the Ministry of the Interior. The actions will culminate in demonstrations and rallies on March 14.

Representatives of the Union of the Socially Disadvantaged and the Union of Cardiacs, some of them officers of the reserve of the Defense Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior and Antifascist Fighters, are among the most active organizers of the protest actions, the Press Centre reported. The protests were occasioned by the steps taken by the Ministry of Finance towards the reversion of the state property of the DUMA Publishing House and the "DUMA" daily. However, the protesters may try to destabilize the situation in Sofia and the country by provoking demands for the government's resignation.

The Ministry of the Interior does not rule out the possibility of conflicts and clashes in Sofia's center. Protesters will probably attribute the blame for them to parliament, the government and the president. According to the Ministry of the Interior, this may sharply escalate political tensions. The actions in question can pose a real threat to the social peace, the Press Centre says in conclusion, adding that the competent authorities will take the necessary lawful measures.

SDS Council Supports Decommunization Bill

*AU1003181192 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1515 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] On 10 March the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) supported with a full majority the draft bill on decommunization, prepared by National Assembly member Sasho Stoyanov and 23 other SDS members of the National Assembly, and recommended to the SDS National Assembly faction to also support the draft bill. This was reported at a news conference today by Father Khristofor Subev, deputy chairman of the SDS National Coordinating Council.

Bulgaria will not become a reservation for the Communists, because in so doing we would become the laughingstock of Europe, he said, and added that the draft law contains a completely objective and principled attitude. According to Sasho Stoyanov, the author of the draft bill, it is very comprehensive and radical and is aimed mainly against the former nomenklatura and the State Security agents.

The draft bill does not violate the right to work or any other human right, but only restricts the access of the people mentioned in it, to leading posts, he said.

Mr. Sasho Stoyanov does not think there is any contradiction between the position of President Zhelyu Zhelev and the SDS National Coordinating Council on the issue of decommunization.

Zhelev Receives BSP Leaders Videnov, Ananieva

*AU1003145092 Sofia BTA in English
1427 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Sofia, March 10 (BTA)—Today President Zhelyu Zhelev received Mr. Zhan Videnov and Mrs. Nora Ananieva at the request of the leadership of the opposition Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). They informed him of the results of their visit to Greece, the Press Centre of the president told BTA.

Mr. Videnov and Mrs. Ananieva raised some topical problems for the BSP internal political and expressed the wish of their party to take part in the discussions on the future of the Security Services. The president said that this is quite possible because their party is represented in the parliamentary National Security Committee.

The leaders of the BSP expressed their support for the president's stand on the decommunization bill. President Zhelev said that he had openly expressed his belief that the passage of such an act would be an obstacle to Bulgaria's membership in the Council of Europe and its association with the EC. Such an act, Dr. Zhelev added, would not contribute to the democratization of this country and would in fact impede decommunization, which actually amounts to reforms with the participation of a maximum number of people, including former Communists who have come to realize the failure of the past political system. A replacement of a system presupposes wide support for the reforms. Several decades ago the Communists also replaced the system but did not enjoy such support and resorted to terror and violence, assassinations and camps. We will not let this happen, we will seek some form of maximum support and a basis for accord—this is the democratic solution to the problem and it has no alternative.

As regards the culprits, they will be tried in court, the Bulgarian head of state told the leaders of the opposition party.

Property Confiscation Order Served on Publisher

*AU1103100592 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
6 Mar 92 p 1*

[DUMA PRESS report]

[Text] On the afternoon of 5 March employees from Ivan Kostov's ministry left an order at the DUMA Publishing House for the confiscation of its property. The order was issued on 24 February, and the ministry's employees recorded that they had delivered it on 5 March. They did not want to hand the order over to Rumyan Georgiev, the publishing house's general director, despite the fact that they had a meeting arranged for 1700. Mrs. Mariya

Shipkovenska did this later on the Bulgarian Television program "Otzvuk" [Response].

All of the publishing house's property was acquired legally and solely through its economic activities. We have sufficient economic arguments to contest the order. Rumyan Georgiev told the journalists gathered to see the serving of the order that the newspaper had not taken anything, but in fact had contributed revenue to the budget.

No one wants to stop the publication of DUMA and the other newspapers affected by the law, nor do we want to become publishers, Ivan Kostov promised journalists at the Council of Ministers on 5 March. We will confiscate the property and in this way the law will have been implemented. We think that this "crisis" will be solved when the editors rent the property, the implementer of the "Kennedy" law added.

The state has a monopoly on the printing of newspapers. The confiscation of the DUMA Publishing House's property is intended to introduce censorship through economic measures. Rumyan Georgiev stated that it is naive to claim that the newspaper can get by without property. He stressed that the DUMA Publishing House does not dispute the law, because it was adopted by a democratically elected parliament; however, it is a fact that something has been confiscated that was not state property but acquired solely through the publishing house's economic activities.

In 1991 alone the DUMA Publishing House's profits were 3,919,773 leva, more than half of which will be contributed to the budget in the form of taxes. The publishing house paid more than 6.5 million leva in turnover tax in 1991. During its almost two years of existence DUMA has always been profitable. During the last 10 years DUMA and its predecessor RABOT-NICHESKO DELO made over 18 million leva in profits.

The DUMA Publishing House was established with the assets and liabilities of the DUMA newspaper. Rumyan Georgiev stressed that the statements heard in parliament that the company's statutory capital stands at 9 billion leva are untrue. The confiscation order served on the DUMA Publishing House would mean the closure of DUMA and a further five papers. A court appeal will be made against the minister of finance's order within the legal time limit.

It is said that the state does not want to be a publisher. If the law were applied strictly, the newspapers themselves ought to be confiscated together with the property and the state ought to begin paying the journalists' salaries. However, the state could not produce newspapers at its own expense, because it would also have to support the loss-making ones. The money from subscriptions is supposed to remain with the publishing houses. The rent is not going to be dependent on whether the newspaper is making a profit. Kostov stated that it is the editorial staffs' own job to decide on what relations to maintain

with their publishing house, whether to accept subsidies or whether to contribute a proportion of their profits to the publisher.

According to Kostov, there is no problem regarding the purchase of the property. The journalists are not to become state employees, the finance minister believes. However, he did not specify exactly how the newspapers will be published without property.

Kozloduy Nuclear Plant Restarts Reactor 4

AU1103113192 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 11 Mar 92

[Text] Early this morning the No. 4 Generating Unit of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant was reconnected to the national power grid, delivering an output of 440 megawatts. Here is a report from our correspondent Veselin Angelov.

[Begin Angelov recording] The unit was shut down for one week to carry out preventative maintenance. Now that it has been restarted, Kozloduy is producing almost 60 million kilowatt-hours of electric power per day. As regards the 1,000-megawatt units, the No. 5 Unit is operating at 90-percent capacity, and the No. 6 Unit at 75-percent capacity. The 440-megawatt No. 3 Unit is also operating normally.

Engineer Yordan Yordanov, spokesman of the Kozloduy Plant, announced that the plant is continuing to carry out the program for renewing and updating the two oldest generating units, Nos. 1 and 2, which started operating 17 years ago. By the end of this week, a complex technical operation will be completed on the No. 1 reactor. The three-year reconstruction program is being strictly fulfilled, as the most important requirement for ensuring the operational safety and reliability of these old generating units. [end recording]

Commander Says Navy Accepts Reform

AU1003125992 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA
in Bulgarian 4 Mar 92 p 3

[Interview with Vice Admiral Ventseslav Velkov, commander of the Navy, by Tosho Lizhev; place and date not given: "The Sailors With Shoulder Stripes Accept the Reform"]

[Text] Vice Admiral V. Velkov is 51 years old and a candidate of military science. He graduated from Varna Higher Education Naval School in 1956 after majoring in navigation. In 1971 he attended the Admiral Kuznetsov Naval Academy in St. Petersburg (then Leningrad), and a year later another higher education course at the same academic institute. He has served on torpedo missile boats; he was a formation commander, chief of the Navy's General Staff (1988), and chief naval inspector in the Ministry of Defense's Inspectorate. He speaks English. His wife is a trained economist, and his son serves on a combat ship (rank—lieutenant).

[Lizhev] Admiral, what is the state of our naval fleet?

[Velkov] About 80 percent of our technology is obsolete and out of date. In reality we only possess three combat boats that are fully up to date. Working and leisure conditions on our most dilapidated boats are quite difficult.

[Lizhev] This has obviously been the case for some time....

[Velkov] For the last fifteen years little attention has been paid to the country's navy. For this reason such a large percentage of the boats are due to be replaced.

[Lizhev] Certain newspapers have carried stories saying that our combat boats are not even fit to give chase to small Turkish fishing boats. Is this true?

[Velkov] This is a fallacy. On principle, for economic reasons, fishing vessels do not have powerful motors and can reach 8 to 10 knots. Whereas, we, as border guards, have ships that are three to four times quicker. I can vouch that the Navy is in a state to and will continue to fulfill its control functions in defense of the national interests. We have both the forces and the experience to do this. In the concept developed by the General Staff it is envisaged that out of date boats will be replaced in stages. This process will be completed by the year 2000.

[Lizhev] You speak with confidence. However, bearing in mind how expensive military technology is, is the country in a state to secure it?

[Velkov] It is true that a combat boat now costs between 30 million to over 70 million dollars. However, no small country like ourselves is in a state to resolve such a problem alone. We will hope that we receive aid. With the present development in relations with NATO and the maintenance of traditional relations with the Black Sea naval fleet of the former USSR, a favorable situation exists for implementing reform in the Navy.

[Lizhev] You once mentioned that our Navy would "open itself up" for civilian activities. Is this a realistic economic asset beneficial to the reform?

[Velkov] Yes, of course. We can earn money and this is what we will do. In peacetime it is absolutely imperative, not to mention the fact that it is unforgivable for Bulgaria to allow itself the luxury of duplicating military and civilian activities such as life-saving (coastal), hydrometeorological, or cartographic activities. The Navy can participate in the battle against smuggling and drug-trafficking; it can carry out various services with its

auxiliary ships (transport, loading, towing); it can perform salvage operations, uncover sources of pollution, and possibly detain the perpetrators, maintain the light-houses along the whole length of the country's coastline and the floating navigational indicators, measure water depths, and so on. Some of these activities we can take over entirely which will save the "civilian" budget quite a lot of money. We also intend to broaden the functions of the Higher Educational Naval School—we will invite cadets for training from other countries including from western countries.

[Lizhev] Admiral, what should we understand by the term reasonable defense sufficiency?

[Velkov] In relation to Bulgaria's Navy, our neighbors have never expressed misgivings about its aggressiveness. The function of our naval fleet is purely defensive. On the other hand we do not fool ourselves that our fleet alone can deflect a possible attack by a neighboring state. Of course, such a threat does not exist at the moment; we are talking in principle. However, in principle, reasonable defense sufficiency means that we are in a state during a localized conflict to inflict losses on the enemy, which make it unacceptable for it to achieve the political aims it has set itself.

[Lizhev] It is said that new concepts require new people....

[Velkov] We possess well-trained and experienced cadres. It is the technological infrastructure that needs renewing.

[Lizhev] However, our army will gradually become professional, will it not?

[Velkov] The Navy even now is the most professional armed service in the country. We will move over to the gradual contractual appointment of sailors. In my opinion it follows that we must find the optimum ratio of professionals to conscripts. For the Navy this is around 60-65 percent professionals to 35-40 percent conscripts.

[Lizhev] Admiral, is it true that certain officers, albeit under their breath, are grumbling about the reform?

[Velkov] Recently I have had meetings at all naval bases and formations. It is true that some of the officers do not approve the expected cadres changes, but these are mainly those who will lose their posts. The reform is being accepted. I am certain of that. Certain posts have to be cut since we have set ourselves the task of optimizing the management structures. This is a purely professional problem and an objective necessity for the Navy.

Reaction to Split in Christian Democratic Movement**Havel Sees 'More Intelligible' Politics**

LD0903200492 Prague CSTK in English
1906 GMT 9 Mar 92

[Text] Prague March 9 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel said today Saturday's split in the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) would result in "more intelligible" politics from the resulting two groups.

A group led by Jan Klepac, deputy chairman of the Slovak Parliament, broke from the KDH Saturday to form a new nationalist-oriented party called the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (SKDH).

Havel told journalists he thought the KDH had earlier been marked by ambiguity because, he said, each KDH decision and position was the result of a compromise between two factions.

Havel told journalists that statements made by former CSFR General Prosecutor Ivan Gasparovic after being recalled from office by Havel earlier this month confirmed Havel's conviction that he made the right decision in recalling Gasparovic. Havel denied accusations that the decision to recall Gasparovic was the result of political pressures.

Gasparovic earlier told the Slovak daily NARODNA OBRODA that "my being recalled from office was clearly a political move", and that his ties to Vladimir Meciar, former Slovak prime minister and current leader of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), was one of the main reasons he was recalled.

Split Seen as 'Tactical Maneuver'

AU1103135092 Bratislava VEREJNOST
in Slovak 7 Mar 92 p 2

[CSTK report: "A Tactical Maneuver?"]

[Text] The Slovak National Party [SNS] welcomes current developments in the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]. SNS Chairman Jozef Prokes said so in Bratislava yesterday. As he stated, "it was time for the national forces within the KDH to stop being towed along by the kind of policy the KDH has represented to date." He referred to an interesting fact. In his opinion, the Jan Klepac wing "wants to be an opposition party, but, at the same time, wants to remain in the government coalition." SNS representatives have not ruled out the possibility that this could be a tactical maneuver on the part of the KDH to win over a larger number of nationally oriented voters. Slovak National Council [SNR] Deputy Anton Hrnko also underlined this point of view. He personally believes that this situation involves a "deliberate split" on the part of the Christian Democrats. As J. Prokes said, SNS deputies will attempt to include a draft declaration on Slovakia's sovereignty

on the SNR's agenda before the elections and, according to him, the intentions of the "Klepac wing" will become clear in this regard.

Press Views Impact

AU1003141892 Prague CSTK in English
0834 GMT 9 Mar 92

[Excerpts] Prague, Bratislava March 9 (CSTK)— Commenting on the secession of the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (SKDH) from the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) of Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky on Saturday [7 March], the Czechoslovak independent daily LIDOVE NOVINY says that with its 11 deputies to the Slovak regional parliament, the SKDH will be the force that will decide whether or not privatization in Slovakia will continue and whether or not a declaration on the sovereignty of Slovakia will be issued. While the orientation of the SKDH, led by Slovak parliament deputy chairman Jan Klepac, is clear (confederative state setup of Czechoslovakia at least and more or less socialist economy), Carnogursky's orientation is unclear. After the departure of economy ministers, Carnogursky does not have economists capable of drafting an economic program (for the election campaign) and his notion of a common state is also still unclear.

On the same theme, the Czech farmers' daily ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY says that more than 70 percent of the Slovak population tend towards religion, and they must be won over. "If the term 'secession' is stressed and the term 'division' is suppressed (in connection with the creation of the SKDH), this may mean that after the (general) elections which are already in the offing (June 5-6), both parts (of the original KDH) will merge again. [no end quote mark as received]

The independent daily MLADA FRONTA DNES notes the SKDH leader on Saturday avoided a direct reply to the question what the SKDH stand will be if a declaration of Slovakia's sovereignty is submitted in the Slovak parliament. The paper says Klepac's contacts with the strongly national-orientated Slovak National Party (SNS) are well known. He also has supporters in the Movement For a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), led by former Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar, which has loudly acclaimed the process of differentiation within the KDH. [passage omitted]

NARODNA OBRODA comments on the secession of the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (SKDH) from the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), headed by Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky, on Saturday. The paper says the SKDH faction, headed by Slovak parliament deputy chairman Jan Klepac, is assuming responsibility for political stability in Slovakia. "It can be expected the KDH will shift more to the right, while the SKDH more to the left," the paper concludes.

Commenting on the same topic, the KDH daily SLOV-ENSKY DENNIK notes the biggest loss of KDH members will be in central Slovakia where the conversion of the arms production results in leftist sentiments.

"Like it or not, after the general election (slated on June 5-6) the SKDH will have to join the left but with far weaker position than a strong and united KDH," the paper says.

The trade union daily PRACA says "the SKDH may attract political sympathizers from the parties which have not lent an ear to their views on the Slovak statehood and economic reforms."

The daily VEREJNOST, founded by the Public Against Violence (VPN) movement, says though both factions (the KDH and the SKDH) get on so far as Christians, there are deep contradictions in views on the state setup and economic reforms, and it cannot be excluded, according to the paper, that the two Christian movements will become warring sides in the future. [passage omitted]

Dubcek Criticizes Havel's Dismissal of Prosecutor
AU1003142592 Prague CSTK in English
1918 GMT 8 Mar 92

[Text] Bratislava March 8 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak Parliament Chairman Alexander Dubcek thinks the dismissal of Czechoslovak Prosecutor General Ivan Gasparovic March 2 was an erroneous step by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel.

Speaking to CSTK, Dubcek said the president should consult decisions on key questions with relevant constitutional bodies.

Dubcek said he was surprised by the decision the more so that the day after Gasparovic's dismissal, the federal parliament started its 21st session, the agenda of which included drafting a resolution on Gasparovic's report on the work of Czechoslovak prosecution.

Gasparovic was criticized by rightist parties especially for handling cases of former communist regime leading figures. He justified his steps by the existing legislation, beyond the framework of which he cannot go.

Dubcek also spoke about the announcement February 13 by the Czechoslovak Interior Ministry that several former leading communists, including party Central Committee Secretary Zdenek Mlynar, committed treason in connection with the 1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Dubcek said it is necessary to deal with the question who and how "contributed" to Czechoslovakia's occupation, but he regards it incorrect if the Interior Ministry classifies deeds without decision by an objective body—a court.

He said Mlynar, just as Frantisek Barbirek (member of the Slovak Communist Party Presidium and of the

Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee in August 1968) stood against the occupation in the night of August 20.

Dubcek said he believes the Prosecutor General's Office will work for all facts to be objectively studied in accord with Czechoslovak law.

Dubcek also spoke about the need to maintain social peace in Czechoslovakia to which the adoption of several social laws (he did not specify them) could contribute.

He pointed out that many outstanding political scientists in the West, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, say that Central and Eastern Europe should be more sensitive to the social aspects of economic transformation.

Dubcek said he identifies himself with the politicians and economists whose goal is a social market economy.

Finance Minister Reports on State of Budgets
LD1103040192 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko
Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Report by Jan Kulhavy from the 21st joint session of the Federal Assembly]

[Text] Vaclav Klaus, minister of finance and federal deputy prime minister, presented the government report on the state of the budget of the federation and the federal, Czech, and Slovak budgets together in 1991. The report is the first complete evaluation of the budget management last year, despite the fact that not all final data are available yet. That is one of the reasons Vaclav Klaus expressed the wish that the report not become the basis of categorical verdicts on the economic policy as a whole.

The government rates highly the fact that during the difficult period of transformation of the economy social peace has not been impaired. A number of other economic conditions had a substantially unfavorable impact; for example, the decline in demand on virtually all domestic markets was 15 percent of the gross national product, which is higher than the government expected. On the other hand, positive things are that the Czechoslovak economy ceased to be limited in its supply, the market has become a market of consumers, [words indistinct].

According to Klaus the development of the implementation of state budgets in 1991 can be divided into several stages. Up to June there were high surpluses, in particular thanks to existing reserves. Pressure for additional expenditures were causing deficits in the republics' budgets at the beginning of the second half of the year, although in October the surplus in all three budgets was 8 billion korunas; in other words, it corresponded to the planned level.

The end of last year was a turning point. Due to the republics' deficits the total of all three budgets resulted in a final deficit of 18.6 billion korunas. The causes of the

deficit are well known, especially the purposeless expenditures in the republics without any worries about how they will be covered by the budgets. This is also shown by the fact that the implementation of the federation's budget ended in a surplus of 6.4 billion korunas, despite the fact that the total loss of planned income for the federal budget was relatively low, roughly 24 billion korunas, representing merely 5 percent of all budget items.

In view of uncontrollable budget management by the republics at the end of last year, the Financial Council of the Federation decided to implement some regulatory measures in the first quarter of this year. This practice will remain in force during 1992.

Finance Minister Assesses Talks With IMF

LD0803133592 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko
Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 7 Mar 92

[Interview with Vaclav Klaus, federal deputy prime minister and finance minister, by Zdena Balcerova, date and place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] Vaclav Klaus, federal deputy prime minister and finance minister, returned today from the United States where he had talks with representatives of important American companies and took part in meetings at which he reported about the course of the Czechoslovak reform. Zdena Balcerova has interviewed Vaclav Klaus about his impression of his visit. [passage omitted]

[Balcerova] During your visit you also had talks with representatives of the IMF and the World Bank. What was their assessment of our economic reform?

[Klaus] The IMF's assessment of our economic reform was I believe very positive. I had talks with Mr. Camdessus, IMF executive director, and while I was there a document assessing the course of our program of reforms was being distributed. It is envisaged that the program will be debated by the IMF leadership at the beginning of April, but it has been indicated all round that there will not be any problems.

[Balcerova] How does the IMF assess the results of last year's budgetary policy?

[Klaus] On the one hand they assess it negatively, while on the other hand the IMF is having somewhat larger problems with the majority of our neighboring countries, so that in the end we in essence got away with it. This should not however be a cause for satisfaction. On the contrary, it is necessary that we have our budgetary expenditure under more control. We have to have an accurate regulatory mechanism built into it which will control this or that expenditure.

[Balcerova] Did you also talk about the decline in industrial output in Czechoslovakia?

[Klaus] The decline in industrial output is understood by the IMF in the sense that this is not a crisis or a depression or something similar, but that this is a shock caused by the transformation of our economy during which completely unproductive, irrational, economic activities artificially created in the past are having to go. In this sense the sooner these activities are wound up the better it will be.

Temporary Trade Agreement With EC Outlined

AU1003105892 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
4 Mar 92 pp 1, 2

["rw"-signed report: "1,300 Items Freed of All Customs Fees"]

[Text] The Temporary Agreement on Trade and Trade-Related Issues Between the CSFR and the European Communities took effect on 1 March. On the basis of this agreement, preferential customs rates apply to the imports of most types of goods from EC countries to the CSFR, provided that the origin of the goods in the EC countries is conclusively demonstrated.

As we were told by Engineer I. Klabouchova from the CSFR Central Customs Administration, imported industrial products have been subdivided into four categories depending on the degree of customs relief. The "A" list includes unprotected products that are fully exempt from all customs fees as of 1 March. This list comprises about 1,300 items. Goods that can be imported customs-free include, for example, record players, tape recorders, and video recorders.

The antipode of the "A" list is the "C" list, which consists of strongly protected products. For the time being, no customs relief applies to goods that are included in that list. The aim is to protect the domestic production of footwear and some textile products, for example. But strongly protected products can be found in all chapters of the customs tariff, with second-hand cars, for example, also belonging to this group.

New passenger cars are included in the "D" list, which consists of products, the customs fees of which have been lowered to 80 percent of the original customs rate.

The same preferential treatment also applies to products included in the "B" list, which consists of most items of the customs tariff. As of 1995, the customs fees of products included in this group will be lowered to 40 percent of the original customs rates. As of 1997, products from the "B" list will be imported free of all customs fees. For products on the "C" and "D" lists, the elimination of customs fees will be slower; they will disappear only as of 1 January 2001.

Slovak Celebration Organizer Sees 'Danger'

AU1103113892 Prague CSTK in English
1659 GMT 9 Mar 92

[Text] Bratislava March 9 (CSTK)—The chairman of the separatist Slovak National Unity Party (SNJ), Stanislav Panis, said today he expects "provocations" on the part of "federalists" during SNJ-organized celebrations March 14 to mark the 53rd anniversary of the wartime independent Slovak State.

"I am in danger of being shot from some roof or of a bomb being placed under the speaker's platform", he told journalists.

He said the SNJ has appealed to Slovak Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner to ensure order during the celebrations. Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel was invited to take part, he said, but a presidential assistant wrote to say that Panis' views of Czechoslovakia's past, current situation, and the future were unacceptable to Havel and that Havel thus could not accept the invitation.

Panis said also joining in the celebrations would be members of the Tiso society. The group propagates the ideas of Josef Tiso, president of the nominally-independent Slovak State which existed under the protection of Nazi Germany from 1939-1945.

Pithart on Slovak Anniversary Celebration

LD1003223892 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network
in Czech 1800 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Interview with Czech Premier Petr Pithart by Zbynek Honys; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Honys] Mr. Premier, we should stay with one topic, that is, Czech-Slovak relations, which, in the past few days, have again been the focus of attention for the Czech Government and the political parties active on our scene. What is your view on the political parties now wanting to speak (on this topic)?

[Pithart] That is natural, they have a right to it, I would say it is their duty at the moment to give to the public the right or an indication of how they see the situation. Yesterday, however, the government presidium, which is regularly meeting on Mondays, considered it necessary to react to the viewpoint of the Civic Democratic Alliance which intends to submit certain proposals for, I assume, a technical solution of a possible division of the state. The presidium considered it necessary to tell the public—I quote—that the government of the Czech Republic was and is fully ready to promptly react to all the situations which might arise as a result of a threat to the common state by non-constitutional means. In this connection, the presidium also noted that the government of the Czech Republic continues to endorse the principles of a common state, based, however, on democratic principles.

In other words, the government was and is fully prepared. That is, since at least autumn 1990, we have been working on all our reactions to all the variants of state disintegration. Frankly speaking, I am not completely sure if the Civic Democratic Alliance can bring something new. In other words, the government—and that is its basic duty - must be prepared in every situation, and I should also like to say that we are prepared.

[Honys] Mr. Premier, tomorrow is the beginning of the celebrations of the birth of the Slovak state in Slovakia. Various political forces in Slovakia, according to our information, intend to join in these celebrations in all sorts of ways. Not all of them, not with the same intensity. Despite this we know, according to our reports, that Matica Slovenska is going to start it tomorrow and that everything is going to culminate on Saturday when some Slovak politicians assume that up to 100,000 Slovaks will take part in this rally for the birth of Slovakia.

[Pithart] These are truly serious matters and the government cannot keep silent in such times. Last year, the government, on the eve of the celebrations, adopted the viewpoint that we wanted to remind the Slovak public that in the Czech historical calendar the 14 March is printed in black, not only because the 15 March is marked that way, when the rest of Czechoslovakia was occupied in 1939. [passage omitted]

Our public and the Czech political scene will react not only to [words indistinct] but also to how the competent Slovak organs will react. This will be more important than anything else.

[Honys] Mr. Premier, I mentioned that vast participation is expected at these rallies. Despite this, for a long time, we were persuading one another that in Slovakia there is a silent majority which wants a common Czechoslovak state and does not wish to have anything to do with these events.

[Pithart] Certainly, you probably want to say that the whole of Slovakia will not be accommodated on the vast Bratislava square, and that only its certain, let us say, very specific part can fit there. It will be important to see how the Slovak public will react to what is going to happen in Bratislava in the next four days.

[Honys] Mr. Premier, we have no alternative but to ask how the Czech government is going to spend these four days?

[Pithart] Well, you are asking the right question. We thought about it and we agreed that the government, the individual members of the government will be within reach during the weekend, so that we know where everybody is, and we will meet if need be. We do not want to dramatize the situation, but I repeat: The basic task of the government is to be ready.

[Honys] Mr. Premier, thank you for the interview.

Slovak Official on Talks With Czech Parliament

AU1103150492 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 7 Mar 92 p 3

[Interview with Frantisek Miklosko, Slovak National Council chairman, by Alena Melicharkova; place and date not given: "He Refuses To Be Pressured"]

[Text] On 4 March the Czech National Council Presidium adopted a resolution according to which it considers any further talks with the Slovak National Council Presidium on the constitutional arrangement to be pointless unless the Slovak partner specifies the purpose of the talks. Therefore, we asked Frantisek Miklosko, Slovak National Council chairman, several questions:

[Melicharkova] The adoption by the Czech National Council Presidium of the aforementioned resolution caused an unpleasant situation in the question of further talks. How do you intend to deal with this?

[Miklosko] I admit that this resolution gave me a certain feeling of perplexity. What the common working commission achieved in Milovy was a document to be submitted to the presidiums. The Slovak National Council Presidium disapproved of the document, while the Czech National Council Presidium assumed a stand that I myself did not consider to be an assumption of a stand. It declared the document a basis for talks between the national council presidiums. The same thing happened again in Wednesday's resolution of this body.

[Melicharkova] All the same, the Slovak side offered a certain solution....

[Miklosko] In our resolution we proposed an exchange of specific comments by the clubs, to be followed by a meeting on this basis. At the meeting, we would finally decide whether there is a chance of our accepting the treaty or whether we should terminate the process. We have processed the clubs' comments, and we have them available. The Czech National Council has not sent us their comment, and does not even intend to do so. In view of this, I consider inadequate that part of the Czech National Council resolution that says that the Czech National Council Presidium will consider further talks pointless unless we specify the subject of the talks. If I were to put it a little more harshly, I would say that this is undue pressure, which I, as the Slovak National Council chairman reject.

[Melicharkova] The eventual meeting between the presidiums became more problematic after the aforementioned resolution of the Czech partner. What will be the reaction of the Slovak National Council?

[Miklosko] The Slovak National Council Presidium will deal with it on 10 March. To demand that the object of the talks be specified at the moment when we proposed the exchange of comments seems problematic to me, and I also do not consider it good that we are given a certain ultimatum. That is not the way to treat the collective head of the Slovak Republic. Whatever the outcome of

the talks may be, the wish in my heart has always been that the conclusions are reached in a cultivated way, and if need be to agree in a peaceful atmosphere that we did not manage to attain an accord. At a time when war is raging everywhere around us, such a signal would be of tremendous importance. I personally am ready, if not otherwise, then at least to meet with the Czech National Council chairman so that we, as representatives of the two parliaments, could draw some conclusions from these talks that in more than a year of difficult negotiation reached only the point at which they are now.

Deputy Outlines Slovakia's Defense Capability

AU1003151392 Bratislava PRAVDA
in Slovak 7 Mar 92 p 5

[Interview with Slovak National Council Deputy Roman Hofbauer by Peter Kuchar; place and date not given: "Is Slovakia Threatened From the South?"]

[Text] The changes in the CSFR's defense doctrine mean a great deal of reorganization for the Army. Slovakia's defense should be reinforced within its framework. Although we have no enemies, we are prepared to defend ourselves against anyone. At least, this is what Defense Ministry representatives say. Slovak National Council [SNR] Deputy Roman Hofbauer was curious about the real state of affairs and submitted an interpellation to the Slovak prime minister. We were interested in what he found out.

[Hofbauer] I asked Jan Carnogursky, Slovak prime minister and chairman of the Slovak Defense Council, five questions. I received a comprehensive and matter-of-fact reply. Nevertheless, it is unsatisfactory from the point of view of its contents.

[Kuchar] What is the redeployment situation?

[Hofbauer] According to the reply I received, a change in the number of personnel in units based in Slovakia is envisaged up to 1995. The number of personnel in Slovak ground units is derived from the divisions to be formed when the state faces a defense emergency—that is, 33.3 percent of all troops should be deployed in Slovakia. Under normal circumstances the divisions formed during mobilization only exist on paper. I did not receive a reply to my question about the percentage of complete units that should be based in Slovakia in peacetime.

[Kuchar] A great deal is being said about the Air Force....

[Hofbauer] Five percent of the Air Force is deployed in Slovakia. It is composed of a single unit at Slac equipped with obsolete and technically outdated MIG 21 aircraft. They were state-of-the-art aircraft 30 years ago, but today.... The prime minister refers to the small number of suitable airfields and to the population's resistance. However, we have other airfields, such as

Svidnik and Kuchyna, that are exclusively military airfields. Nothing has been said about the airfield in Presov for a long time.

[Kuchar] Does air defense fare any better?

[Hofbauer] So far, Slovakia is not fully covered by the complete range of short, medium, and long-range devices.

[Kuchar] Were you also interested in armored units...

[Hofbauer] Apparently, 31 percent of tanks and combat infantry vehicles are deployed in Slovakia. Obviously, these are the older models. If there are more modern ones here, then the prime minister did not mention them in his reply.

[Kuchar] What about antitank weapons?

[Hofbauer] There are no combat antitank helicopters in Slovakia. The prime minister says there is not enough money to materially and technically provide for combat helicopters. I know the Soviets had combat helicopters at Sliac. What was good enough for them should also be good enough for us. After all, we use the same helicopters as they do. Indeed, there is no need to build anything there.

[Kuchar] What is your appraisal of the course of action taken by the government and the SNR in issues relating to Slovakia's defense capability?

[Hofbauer] The prime minister's reply does not document the level of Slovakia's defense capability. The government has involved itself only slightly in these issues and the SNR is passive. The Defense and Security Committee should deal with this issue. However, it is involved in activity that is not its primary task. At the same time, the Army's deployment does not correspond to the current situation. After all, in the region to the south of us very senior officials are voicing opinions about defending the interests of Hungary in the Carpathian basin. Apart from this, one third of resources is allotted to Slovakia in the military budget. They are utilized where the Army is deployed. However, one third of the Armed Forces is not deployed in Slovakia.

Paper Publishes List of Registered Parties

First Installment

AU0503094292 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY
in Czech 2 Mar 92 p 5

[First installment of an unattributed list: "Political Parties and Movements"]

[Text] The Czechoslovak political scene consists of 111 political parties and movements, 47 of which are registered in both republics. An additional 26 parties and movements operate only in the Czech Republic and as many as 38 additional parties and movements operate only in the Slovak Republic.

Parties and Movements Operating Nationwide

Agrarian Republican Party [Agrarni republikanska strana] (ARS). Founded in January 1992 through merger of the Republican Party of the Czechoslovak Countryside [Republikanska strana cs. venkova] and the Party of Czech Countryside [Strana ceskeho venkova], wants to defend the interests of the countryside, but also of small and medium-sized towns. Chairman Radim Donat.

Association of Social Democrats [Asociace socialnich demokratu] (ASD). Builds on the tradition of the so-called independent socialists, recognizes the civic principle, supports the state's federal setup. Chairman Rudolf Battek.

Country-Wide Citizens Forum [Celostatni aktiv obcanu]. A political movement of citizens and public organizations cooperating in tackling specific problems of communities, districts, regions, and larger territorial entities. Chairman Milan Zezula.

Czechoslovak Social Democracy [Ceskoslovenska socialni demokracie] (CSSD). Builds on the traditions of the social democratic movement in Czechoslovakia and the world. Chairman Jiri Horak.

Czechoslovak Social Union [Ceskoslovenska socialni unie]. Founded in March 1991 by Czechs and Slovaks living in Germany, wants to protect the social and property interests of our fellow countrymen living abroad.

Czechoslovak Party of Humanitarian International [Ceskoslovenska strana humanisticke internacionaly] (CSHI). Defines itself as a party seeking the building of an equitable society for working men and opponents of militarism. Chairman Ladislav Sommer.

Czechoslovak Party of Integration [Ceskoslovenska strana integrace] (CSSI). Has in its program participation in the creation of a socially equitable, humanitarian, and democratic society. Chairman Miroslav Vacek.

Czechoslovak People's Party [Ceskoslovenska strana lidova] (CSL). Chairman Josef Lux.

Czechoslovak Party of Civic and Social Justice [Ceskoslovenska strana obcanske a socialni spravedlnosti]. Founded in 1990 with the program of pinpointing lingering shortcomings in society.

Czechoslovak Party of Working People [Ceskoslovenska strana pracujicich]. A left-wing party seeking consistent respect for human rights and the improvement of the social standing of, in particular, young families.

Czechoslovak Socialist Party [Ceskoslovenska strana socialisticka] (CSS). Defines itself as a party striving for a modern, liberal socialism. Chairman Ladislav Dvorak.

Czechoslovak Democratic Forum [Ceskoslovenske demokratice forum] (CSDF). Founded by breaking away from the Democratic Forum of Communists. Chairman Milan Taraba.

Democratic Left [Demokraticka levice]. Regards itself as a political movement of left-leaning citizens that is above party politics. Chairman Lotar Indruch.

Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia [Demokraticka strana Ceskoslovenska]. Chairman Jan Kukacka.

Democratic Union of Health and Sports [Demokraticka unie zdravi a sportu]. Declares itself a nonideological political party. Chairman Jozef Boris.

Democratic Forum of Communists [Demokraticke forum komunistu] (DFK). An independent current of opinion comprising democratic forces within the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Party of the Democratic Left. One part of DFK supporters established the Czechoslovak Democratic Forum.

Workers' Forum [Forum delniku]. Presents itself as a political movement of workers regardless of party membership or religious belief. Chairman Frantisek Dugovic.

Committed Romanies' Movement [Hnuti angazovanych Romu]. Its program focuses on the protection of the economic, social, and cultural interests of Romanies. Chairman Stefan Tyser.

Movement for Czech/Slovak Accord [Hnuti ceskoslovenskeho porozumeni]. Seeks the preservation of Czechoslovakia as a unitary state. Chairman Vladimir Cech.

Movement of Senior Citizens for Social Guarantees [Hnuti duchodcu za zivotni jistoty]. Chairman Josef Konicek.

Movement for a Democratic Czechoslovakia [Hnuti za demokraticke Ceskoslovensko]. A political grouping subscribing to pluralism, comprising left-wing, social liberal, and Christian center-oriented currents. Chairman Jiri Vyvadil.

Civil Liberties Movement [Hnuti za obcanskou svobodu] (HOS). Founded as an independent civic initiative in October 1988 when it published the "Democracy for All" program manifesto. Registered in March 1990 as a political movement of groups and clubs that are not subordinated to any center. Chairman Jan Stern Sr.

Club of Nonaligned Activists [Klub angazovanych nestraniku] (KAN). Chairman Bohdan Dvorak.

Conservative Party Free Bloc [Konzervativni strana Svobodny blok]. Subscribes to modern Reaganite and Thatcherite Western conservatism. Chairman Jiri Kotas.

Christian Democratic Party [Krestanskodemokraticka strana] (KDS). Defines itself as a nondenominational right-of-center conservative party. Chairman Vaclav Benda.

Christian Democratic Movement [Krestanskodemokraticke hnuti] (KDH). Founded on 30 November 1989 as an all-people's ecumenical movement. Member of the European Democratic Union. Chairman Jan Carnogursky.

Liberal Congress [Liberalni kongres]. Originally Party of Czechoslovak Neutrality [Strana cs. neutrality], subsequently Czechoslovak National Congress [Ceskoslovensky narodni kongres]. Renamed again in March 1991. Chairman Ludvik Holik.

National Social Party-Czechoslovak National Socialist Party [Narodne socialni strana-Cs. strana narodne socialisticka]. Builds on the ideas of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, identifies with liberal tendencies. Chairman Cestmir Cejka.

Independent Initiative [Nezavisla iniciativa] (NEI). Founded as Independent Erotic Initiative, changed its name in late 1991. Chairman Miroslav Mitloehner.

Independent Left [Nezavisla levice]. Defines itself as a party striving for a socially equitable society. Chairman Jaroslav Travnicek.

New Right [Nova pravice]. Wants to bring together citizens with right-wing leanings regardless of their political affiliation with the aim of debolshevizing economic and public life.

Civic Democratic Alliance [Obcanska demokraticka alianca] (ODA). Professes allegiance to the democratic right, Western-type conservatism, and the principles of economic liberalism. Chairman Pavel Bratinka.

Civic Democratic Party [Obcanska demokraticka strana] (ODS). Founded by splitting from the Civic Forum, subscribes to realism and pragmatism, to parliamentary democracy and market economy, seeks a common state based on the territorial and civic principle. Chairman Vaclav Klaus.

Civic Social Activity [Obcanska spolecenska aktivita]. A political movement directed against the electoral law, which discriminated against people not affiliated to any political party.

Organization of Independent Romanians [Organizace nezavislych Rumunu]. A political movement of citizens of Romanian nationality.

Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen [Podnikatelsko-zivnostenska strana]. Founded as the Popular Democratic Party [Vselidova demokraticka strana], registered under its new name in 1990. Contested the 1990 parliamentary elections in coalition with the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia. Chairman Tomas Krulis.

Political Party of Women and Mothers of Czechoslovakia [Politicka strana zen a matek Ceskoslovenska]. Founded through merger of the Prague Mothers [Praske matky] and the Political Party of Women [Politicka strana zen]. Chairwoman Alena Valterova.

Political Movement of Agricultural Cooperatives Members [Politicke hnuti clenů ZD]. Movement of farmers and members of agricultural cooperatives.

Radical Republican Party [Radikalni republikanska strana]. Right-wing party of opponents of M. Sladek's Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, based on the model of Radical Republicans in the United States. General Council Chairman Miroslav Beno.

Republican Party [Republikanska strana]. Its basic programmatic targets are identical with those of the U.S. Republican Party.

Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia [Sdruzeni pro republiku-Republikanska strana Ceskoslovenska]. Chairman Miroslav Sladek.

Party of Czechoslovak Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen [Strana ceskoslovenskych podnikatelů a živnostníků]. Chairman Rudolf Baranek.

European Home Party [Strana evropskeho domu]. Chairman Karel Seda.

Party of Labor [Strana prace]. Chairman of Preparatory Committee Julius Olexa.

Green Party [Strana zelených]. Chairman of Nationwide Council Ales Mucha.

Coexistence [Wspolnota-Souziti-Egyuttes]. Political movement for democracy and the rights of national minorities. Chairman Miklos Duray.

Agricultural Party [Zemedelska strana] (ZS). Originally founded as the Czechoslovak Agricultural Party (CSSZ). Its Slovak part became independent in October 1991. Chairman Frantisek Trnka.

Parties and Movements Operating in the Czech Republic

Democratic Party of Labor [Demokraticka strana prace]. Subscribes to the ideas and program of the Socialist International. Rejects cooperation with the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. Chairman Petr Wurm.

Democratic Forum of Communists [Demokraticke forum komunistu] (DFK). An independent current of opinion comprising democratic forces within the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Party of the Democratic Left. One part of DFK supporters established the Czechoslovak Democratic Forum.

Workers' Forum [Forum delniku]. Presents itself as a political movement of workers regardless of party affiliation or religious belief. Chairman Frantisek Dugovic.

Movement for Equal Status of Women in Bohemia and Moravia [Hnutí za rovnoprávné postavení žen v Čechách a na Moravě]. Chairwoman Eleonora Slavickova.

Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia [Hnutí za samosprávnou

demokracii-Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko] (HSD-SMS). Chairman Jan Krycer. In the course of the electoral period, split into two parts (HSD-SMS I and HSD-SMS II).

Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy] (KSCM). Chairman Jiri Svoboda.

Christian Social Movement [Křesťanskosociální hnutí]. Founded in April 1991 through merger of the Democratic Movement of Christians [Demokratické hnutí křesťanů] and the Christian Social Movement [Křesťanskosociální hnutí]. Is not registered as a political subject. Chairman Josef Macek.

Left Alternative [Leva alternativa] (LA). Movement for democratic and self-managed socialism. Chairman Vladimir Riha.

Liberal Democratic Party [Liberalně demokratická strana] (LDS). Chairwoman Viktorie Hradská. The party has split into a Czech and a Moravian organization.

Moravian National Party [Moravská národní strana] (MNS). Chairman Ivan Drimal.

National Democratic Party [Národně demokratická strana] (NDS). Wants to enforce a national policy, including in the economy, without nationalistic extremes. Supports land setup [zemské uspořádání].

Civic Forum [Občanské fórum]. Founded on 19 November 1989. In February 1991 changed into a movement with two collective members, the Civic Democratic Party and the Civic Movement, which are today independent political parties.

Civic Movement [Občanské hnutí]. Founded after the Civic Forum split as a liberal civic and social movement. Chairman Jiri Dienstbier.

Pan-European Union of Bohemia and Moravia [Panevropská unie Čech a Moravy]. A political movement that has set itself as its goal Czechoslovakia's return to Europe. Chairman Rudolf Kucera.

Through Permanent Opposition Toward Democracy [Permanentní opozice za demokracii]. A political party standing in opposition to any ruling group.

Royalist Movement of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia-Czech Crown [Royalistické hnutí Čech, Moravy a Slezska-Koruna česká]. Supports the establishment of a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system.

Party of the Czech Nation [Strana českého národa]. Preparatory committee established in March 1991, wants to organize the defense of the rights of the Czech nation and its integrity.

Party of Constructive Destruction [Strana konstruktivní destrukce]. Wants to operate as permanent opposition to other political parties, does not seek political power.

Party of Moravian Countryside [Strana moravského venkova]. Works toward the consistent implementation of the principle of community self-administration. Chairman Jaroslav Broz.

Party for the Defense of Culture [Strana obrany kultury] (SOK). Not registered, its objective is to defend culture against bureaucracy, technocratism, and commercialism.

Party of Beer Aficionados [Strana pratel piva]. Wants to operate as one of the guarantees of transition toward political pluralism and combat alcoholism. Chairman Ivo Dvorak.

Party of Free Democrats [Strana svobodných demokratů]. Regards the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the basis of its activity.

Free Farmers Party [Svobodná rolnická strana]. Builds on the traditions of the late 19th century farmers' movement. Contested the 1990 parliamentary elections on the Czechoslovak People's Party's ticket. Chairman Vladislav Hlavko.

Transnational Radical Party [Transnacionalni radikalni strana] (TRS). Seeks the creation of the United States of Europe. One of its constituent parts is the Association of Radicals for the United States of Europe [Asociace radikálu za Spojené státy evropské].

Electoral Alliance of Czechoslovak Entrepreneurs in the Czech Republic [Volební sdružení československých podnikatelů České republiky]. A movement seeking the unification of private entrepreneurs, citizens, and public organizations prior to the elections.

Electoral Alliance of Special Interest Groups in the Czech Republic [Volební seskupení zájmových svazů v České republice]. A political movement comprising voluntary special interest public organizations.

Parties and Movements Operating in Slovakia

Authentic Slovak National Party [Autentická slovenská národná strana]. Builds on the Slovak National Party of the years 1870-1938, has a Christian and national program, endorses the preservation of the federation.

Democratic Party [Demokratická strana] (DS). Builds on the activity of the DS of 1945, calls itself a party of the liberal center. Chairman Jan Holcik.

Movement for Economic Revival-Movement of the Young [Hnutie ekonomickej obrody-hnutie mládeže]. Registered in October 1991 as a political movement of the young unencumbered by the past. Chairman Jozef Vojtech Kšanický.

Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko] (HZDS). Split from the Public Against Violence movement as an independent political subject, registered under its new name in the Slovak

Republic in May 1991 as a movement of the liberal center. Chairman Vladimír Mečiar.

Movement for the Liberation of Slovakia [Hnutie za oslobodenie Slovenska] (HZOS). Seeks the implementation of the Slovak nation's right to state independence. Chairman František Kollar.

Communist Party of Slovakia 91 [Komunistická strana Slovenska 91]. Subscribes to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and Communism. Chairman Julius Fejes.

Liberal Democratic Party in Slovakia [Liberalno-demokratická strana na Slovensku]. Chairman Miroslav Janek.

Romany Unity League [Liga romskej jednoty]. A loose and open association of Romany political parties, organizations, and individuals. Chairman Alojz Pampa.

Hungarian Independent Initiative [Madarska nezavisla iniciativa] (MNI) (Független Magyar Kezdemenyezés). Chairman László Nagy.

Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [Madarske krestansko-democraticke hnutie] (Magyar Keresztény demokrata Mozgalom). Chairman Vojtech Bugar.

National Liberals [Národní liberálové]. Defines itself as a party of the right center, is in favor of an independent Slovakia. Chairwoman Katarína Horváthová.

Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence [Občianska demokratická únia-Verejnost proti násiliu] (ODU-VPN). Transformed itself into a liberal and conservative political party in October 1991. Chairman Martin Porubjak.

Civic Party of Slovakia [Občianska strana Slovenska]. Wants to establish in Slovakia a modern party of the conservative type as a sister party of the ODS.

Pan-European Union of Slovakia [Panevropská únia Slovenska]. A political movement operating as a regional organization of the Paneuropean Union. Chairman Ivan Carnogurský.

The Farmers Party of Slovakia [Rolnícká strana Slovenska]. Emerged out of the Slovak part of the Czechoslovak Agricultural Party, which became independent. Chairman Pavol Delinga.

Slovak People's Party [Slovenská ľudová strana]. Merged in June 1991 with the Movement for an Independent Slovakia [Hnutie za nezávislé Slovensko]. A nationally oriented party seeking the state sovereignty of Slovakia. Chairman Jozef Prokop.

Slovak National Party [Slovenská národná strana] (SNS). Radical national party seeking the independence of Slovakia. Chairman Jozef Prokes.

Slovak National Democratic Movement [Slovenské národno-democraticke hnutie] (SNDH). Movement for the

development of a sovereign Slovakia within the framework of the united system of European states and nations. Chairman Peter Brnak.

Social Democratic Party in Slovakia [Socialno-demokraticka strana na Slovensku]. Operates within the framework of the integrated Czechoslovak social democracy, professes allegiance to the Socialist International. Chairman Boris Zala.

Social Christian Union of Slovakia [Socialno-krestanska unia Slovenska]. Founded by exile Slovaks, asserts the complete legal sovereignty of the Slovak Republic. Chairman Jozef Mikus.

Party of the Democratic Left [Strana demokratickej ľavice] (SDL). Originally a territorial organization of the Federation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In December 1991 it terminated its activity within this federation. Chairman Peter Weiss.

Second Installment

AU0503103592 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY
in Czech 3 Mar 92 p 11

[Second and last installment of an unattributed list: "Political Parties and Movements"]

[Text] Democratic Union of Romanies in Slovakia Party [Strana demokratickej unie Romov na Slovensku]. Wants to secure conditions for a dignified life for the Romany population. Chairman Oskar Gatyas.

Party of Democratic Socialists [Strana demokratických socialistov]. Originally founded as the Party of Democratic Socialism [Strana demokratickeho socializmu]. Orientated toward Slovak national policy and the defense of Slovak interests within the federation, subscribes to the principles of the Socialist International. Chairman Jan Sekaj.

Party for the Integration of Romanies in Slovakia [Strana integracie Romov na Slovensku]. Wants to tackle problems concerning the living and cultural standards of Romanies in Slovakia, rejects the recognition of the Romany nationality by law. Chairman Koloman Gunar.

Party of Christian Democracy [Strana krestanskej demokracie]. A party based on Christian and national principles, upholds the sovereignty of Slovakia. Chairman Ondrej Zelina.

Christian Catholic Party [Strana krestansko-katolicka]. Registered in May 1990.

Party of National Unity [Strana narodnej jednoty] (SNJ). Registered originally as Slovak National Unity [Slovenska narodna jednota]. In October 1991 sought its registration under the name Hlinka's Slovak People's Party [Hlinkova slovenska ludova strana], which the Slovak Ministry of Interior did not accept. Chairman Stanislav Panis.

Party of National Prosperity [Strana narodnej prosperity]. Chairman Rudolf Pardubsky.

Slovak National Unification Party [Strana narodneho zjednocenia Slovakov] (SNZS). Nationally oriented party, the programmatic aim of which is the creation of an independent Slovakia. Chairman Jan Veselovsky.

Party of Independent Democrats [Strana nezavislych demokratov]. Calls itself a party of the center, wants to be in opposition to any power monopoly. Chairman Pavel Petrovic.

Social Democratic Party of Romanies in Slovakia [Strana socialnej demokracie Romov na Slovensku]. Wants to contribute to the comprehensive development of Romanies as a national minority. Chairman Dezider Olah.

Party of Free Democrats [Strana slobodnych demokratov]. Part of the Democratic Union [Demokraticka unia] coalition for the 1992 parliamentary elections. Chairman Juraj Stracelsky.

Freedom Party [Strana slobody] (SSI). Calls itself a party of the liberal center, its program is based on the Cyril-Methodian traditions and the Christian world view. Is in favor of a confederation. Chairman Silvestr Minarovic.

Green Party in Slovakia [Strana zelenych na Slovensku]. Became independent of the nationwide Green Party in June 1991 and assumed a new name. Chairman Peter Sabo.

Trend of the Third Millennium Party [Trend tretieho tisícročia] (TTT). A party of the "green" type, enforces a science-governed ecological policy. Chairman Petr Mudry.

Public for the Family-Women's Party [Verejnost za rodinu-Strana zien]. Seeks conditions for a harmonious development of the family and the equal status of women.

Association of Socialists of Slovakia [Zdruzenie socialistov Slovenska]. Left-wing party close to the international socialist movement. Chairman Ivan Hudec.

Union of Communists of Slovakia [Zvaz komunistov Slovenska]. A political party subscribing to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and socialism, does not regard itself as the successor organization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of Slovakia. Chairman of the Central Preparatory Committee Bohumil Mihalik.

Coalitions

Whereas prior to the 1990 elections the newly established political parties sought electoral alliances as a means of easier access to parliament and we were able to count some 20 such coalitions, today their decision to enter a coalition is more difficult to make. The amendment to the electoral law set a threshold of 7 percent of votes for coalitions of two to three parties and a threshold of 10 percent for coalitions of four and more parties. Even though every day brings new

reports on coalition offers and negotiations, we will have to wait before the final coalition alliances become known. For the time being it is possible to speak of three such alliances:

Coalition of the Civic Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party. Late last week the Civic Democratic Party reached agreement on coalition cooperation and joint lists of candidates also with the Democratic Party. In the electoral districts of the Slovak Republic, they will contest the 1992 parliamentary elections to the Slovak National Council and the Federal Assembly with joint lists of candidates, on which both parties will be represented equally.

Liberal Social Union [Liberalne socialni unie]. Founded in May 1991 as a coalition for the 1992 parliamentary elections, wants to protect the interests of medium-income and lower-income groups of the population.

Members: Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the Agricultural Party, and the Czech organization of the Green Party.

Romany National Congress [Romsky narodni kongres] (RNK). The RNK is the supreme umbrella body of 11 Romany organizations from the whole of the CSFR, upholds left-center positions, demands the enactment of the Romany nationality in the constitution, the representation of Romanies in state administration, and a comprehensive solution to the Romany problem.

Some other coalitions for this year's elections—such as the Social Democratic Union [Socialne demokraticka unie] or the CSFR Leftist Association [Levicove sdruzeni CSFR]—were announced as early as last year but it has not been confirmed as yet whether these coalitions are still in existence and what their composition is.

Gonczi Interviewed, Stresses Nation's Stability

AU0903143892 Vienna KURIER in German
9 Mar 92 p 3

[Report by G. Berenyi on interview with Hungarian President Arpad Goncz; place and date not given: "Hungary Is the Most Stable Country Between the Danube and the Pacific Ocean"]

[Text] His charisma has made State President Arpad Goncz Hungary's most popular politician and a key figure representing the stability of the country. His efforts to help reason prevail—recently he blocked a law that could have triggered a witch-hunt for former communist cadres—are not undisputed.

—Risks concerning the current situation in Hungary: "The stormy historical development is pushing us forward on the path of restructuring our society, to which there is no alternative. This entails enormous burdens. We must now hold our breath under water. It remains to be seen whether our people will realize the inevitability of the current development and whether they will hold out."

—Internal tensions in the country: "Disappointment and unease are typical phenomena that occur after the toppling of a dictatorship. An immense quantity of pain and emotions have accumulated. It is understandable that many people are now trying to call those to account who caused the suffering in the past. However, it is unreasonable for a nation to divert attention from the vital issues and try to solve a conflict by exacerbating the situation. In this spirit, I raise my low voice—which to my surprise has been heard with gratitude—and appeal for a consensus."

—Hungary's political stability: "Despite the tensions that prevail among our society, our people have remained calm in an impressive way, thus ensuring internal stability. Of the countries going through a period of disintegration and renewal, Hungary is considered the most stable—from the Danube to the Pacific Ocean."

—Hungary's possible role concerning a solution to the Yugoslav conflict: "We are vitally interested in the restoration of peace. Our government and I myself are willing to offer our good services for reconciliation upon the request of the parties to the conflict. We want Hungary to become a factor of stability in the region."

—Hungary's ethnic conflicts with its neighbors: "We are not willing to sacrifice the rights of the Hungarian minority for the reduction of tensions. With our 'policy of small steps' we are making use of all—even newly created—opportunities. We will shortly conclude an agreement with Ukraine. A peaceful Yugoslav settlement might also represent an exemplary model for the regulation of minority issues in Europe."

—Future relations with Austria: "I myself have three close relatives in Austria, and numerous ties exist between Austria and Hungary. A total of 2,500 joint ventures have been established. Even if we wanted, it would no longer be possible for us to stop cooperation. Later in the EC, our two countries will form a particularly close community of interests."

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Policy Changes

LD1003160492 Budapest MTI in English
1311 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] Budapest, March 10 (MTI)—Foreign Ministry Spokesman Janos Herman today summarized recent policy changes and upcoming events.

From March 17, Hungarians will need a visa to visit China. The move is apparently a counter to Hungary's visa requirement for Chinese citizens travelling with private passports.

Hungary has begun talking with Serbia, Croatia and Czechoslovakia on reopening the Adriatic oil pipeline, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Janos Herman said today.

Lady Diana will visit with the British National Ballet at President Arpad Goncz's invitation. She will attend the laying of the foundation stone for the new building of Peto Institute looking after children born with nerve injuries.

She will also attend the opening of the British Council and visit the Nagyatad camp of asylum-seekers who mostly fled from the war in the former Yugoslavia.

Herman announced that Andras Paldi has received Ukraine permission to take his post there as ambassador.

Foreign Ministry State Secretary Tamas Katona will participate in the March 30 meeting of hexagonal foreign ministers in Klagenfurt, Austria. The parties to the Klagenfurt talks will take a stand on the admission of Croatia and Slovenia.

Responding to Romanian Foreign Ministry accusations, Herman stressed that the Helsinki principle is respected in Hungary, which it seems Romania does not want to believe.

The Hungarian-Romanian relations are not good, but this is not Hungary's fault, Herman said.

Despite recent visits to Romania by Hungary's environmental Protection Minister, Defence State Secretary and several parliament members, the foreign affairs consultations begun in 1990 show no progress.

The document received from Romania this January is seen by the foreign ministry as a step back from the earlier Romanian stance. The document fails to deal with such problems as the minority declaration or joint committee on nationalities, reopening consulate generals, improving transport links, facilitating the import of press products and cooperation in refugees matter.

Hungary maintains that resolving practical problems is a precondition for European integration. Without it, no final decision can be expected on principal issues, including the conclusion of the basic treaty.

Romania takes up the "Hungarian question" from time to time out of current home policy consideration, for instance during the time of the elections. This is how the Hungarian policy and politicians have recently been subject to growing number of unfounded accusations, which—in Hungary's view—also creates an unfavourable atmosphere for the continuation of the talks concerning the basic treaty.

Military Cooperation Accord With Slovenia Planned

LD1003231592 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2012 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] Budapest, 10 March (TANJUG)—Hungary and Slovenia will sign a military cooperation agreement which will provide for regular consultations between the representatives of the two armies and of the military missions in Budapest and Ljubljana. This was announced today at the end of a two-day official visit to Hungary by Slovene Defense Minister Janez Jansa.

Commenting on this agreement with Slovenia, which has been agreed in principle, Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Fur denied that the agreement envisages any Hungarian arm exports to Slovenia. Minister Fur also denied the claim, the source of which he did not specify, "that Hungary will deliver C-55 tanks [as received] or other armored vehicles to Slovenia and use the money to buy weapons from the arsenal of the former East German Army."

Slovene Defense Minister Janez Jansa said, however—and the statement was carried by MTI—that "Slovenia wants a military agreement with Hungary because it will rely on Hungary's assistance in the development of its defense system," without actually spelling out precisely what Hungarian assistance he expects. He stressed that the military agreement with Hungary, which implies reciprocal consultations, and also the opening of military missions by both parties, in Ljubljana and Budapest, is the first agreement Slovenia is concluding with any neighboring country.

Minister Fur said that Hungary is also willing to conclude a similar military cooperation agreement with Croatia "when the internal situation there has been consolidated." Minister Fur did not say anything about a possible Hungarian agreement with Yugoslavia; last week Erno Raffay, a secretary of state in the Defense Ministry, expressed his willingness to travel to Belgrade for this reason, but he did not fail to accuse the Yugoslav People's Army of allegedly provoking armed conflicts in Croatia.

Janez Jansa in turn ruled out the possibility of a military cooperation agreement with Croatia "as long as armed

conflicts go on there." Adding that Croatia has no territorial demands on Slovenia, Janez Jansa made the claim that "there is still the threat of a Serbian attack, although, unlike Croatia, there is no Serbian minority in Slovenia."

However, Janez Jansa did not find it opportune to explain the basis upon which he reached this conclusion, nor did he explain the evidence upon which he is basing his claims.

Spokesman Details Crime Bill, Loan Guarantee

AU0903155292 Budapest MTI in English 1040 GMT 6 Mar 92

[Text] Budapest 6 Mar (MTI)—The Hungarian Government on Thursday passed a new police bill in second reading, reviewed the position of the agricultural sector and voted a state guarantee to cover the loan to be received from the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for upgrading the telephone system, Government Spokeswoman Judit Juhasz told journalists on Friday morning.

'Police-friendly citizens, citizen-friendly police' could be the motto for the new police bill to be tabled to Parliament for urgent discussion.

Senior Interior Ministry official Karoly Nagy said that the bill sets the protection of public security and order within the country as the foremost duty of the police. These functions will be carried out free from party policy influence, amid the conditions of a law-governed state and with respect for human dignity.

Under the bill, the government will control the police by constitutional legislation, by the appointment of the national police chief and via the minister of the interior.

The interior minister will have the right to give orders to the police, and decide on the adoption of emergency measures and the use of certain means of coercion.

Wire-tapping, secret house search and letter-opening will be permitted in case of crimes involving over five years of penalty under a preliminary court decision. Acts of terror and disturbances of public calm will also come under such a decision of the court.

Nagy said that under the bill the interior minister may determine the physical and psychical conditions of admission to police schools.

The police is also preparing for Budapest Expo '96 by a newly-launched modernization programme.

Minister of Agriculture Elemer Gergatz (Independent Smallholders, Party) reported to Parliament on the position of the sector, the conversion of cooperative farms and the progress in spring works.

On briefing journalists about Gergatz's report, Agricultural Ministry State Secretary Gyorgy Rasko said that

the expected decrease in agricultural production compared to last year's record conforms to the ministry's intention.

Of wheat, for instance, the country needs only a fragment of the 1991 yield of 6 million tonnes, which also led to the formation of a hardly marketable export commodity fund.

As a result of government measures, this year wheat was sown on a 7 per cent smaller territory, with an expected harvest of 4 million tonnes, which will meet domestic needs and allow for some exports.

The animal stock also decreased. The drop in the milk cow population from 554,000 to 490,000 in 1991, and probably by a further 20,000 this year was also the result of government intervention. Even this smaller stock is likely to give 20 per cent more milk than necessary.

The pig population fell from 8 million to 6 million in 1990, but today it is forecast to rise again to 7 million by the end of the year.

Agricultural exports in 1991 yielded an income of 2.7 billion dollars. The figure for this year will probably exceed 2.2 billion dollars, including a net foreign exchange surplus of 1.5 billion, Rasko said. Hungarian agriculture still has a workforce of about 500,000—10 per cent of the economically active population—and the unemployment figure is expected to reach 100,000 by the end of the year.

The government decided to give state guarantee for the DM 185 million EBRD loan intended to finance part of Hungary's three-year telecommunications development scheme. The loan will be taken up by the Hungarian telecommunications company (MATAV) on 12 years, maturity.

According to plans, telephone networks in central Budapest will be upgraded by late 1993, the number of lines doubled and telephones will work 24 hours in every Hungarian village, the spokeswoman said.

Coalition Parties Set Up Coordination Committee

*LD1003181292 Budapest MTI in English
1639 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Budapest, March 10 (MTI)—A coordination committee has been set up by Hungary's three ruling coalition parties as a regular consultation forum.

The committee includes the three faction leaders and 2 board members from each parliamentary group. Hungarian Democratic Forum faction leader Imre Konya told MTI.

The body will meet every two weeks, or more frequently if necessary.

The first meeting is scheduled for this week.

Parliament Discusses Canceling Hydropower Accord

*LD1003204192 Budapest MTI in English
1910 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Budapest, March 10 (MTI)—Hungary is compelled to unilaterally terminate the 1977 Czechoslovak-Hungarian agreement to build a power station at Gabčíkovo and Nagymaros unless certain conditions are met, said Hungarian Transport, Telecommunications and Water Management Minister Csaba Siklos today.

A draft resolution about the 1977 Czechoslovak-Hungarian agreement was discussed in the Hungarian parliament today.

After inter-governmental talks last December, the Czechoslovak government passed a resolution to complete the hydropower system and put it into operation. However, it rejected many Hungarian proposals to set up a joint investigating committee which would examine whether the project is at all environmentally safe. Also, it refused to grant Hungary's request to halt any work that fails to comply with the 1977 accords.

In a letter to his Czechoslovak counterpart, Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall called for immediately halting all construction counter to the 1977 accords. He also suggested launching a joint investigation with impartial experts.

Hungary has asked for backing from other states belonging to the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as other international organizations. Should the efforts fail to bring results, Hungary will be forced to ask parliament to scrap the 1977 bilateral construction treaty, Siklos said.

In terminating the accords, Hungary would inform Czechoslovakia of its readiness to cooperate in eliminating the consequences of the termination and to conclude a new inter-state agreement, he added.

Several parliamentary committees—economic, environmental protection, and foreign affairs—also backed the government proposal.

The Hungarian government's wait-and-see attitude about the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros project was wrong, according to opposition MP [member of parliament] Janos Pap of the Federation of Young Democrats.

Terming the issue "a professional and scientific matter," Pap said an earlier report by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences provides a sufficient basis to make a decision.

According to the report, any plan to complete the hydropower system would endanger Central Europe's largest drinking water supply and disturb the region's ecological balance.

Any impatient move on Hungary's part is bound to drive Czechoslovakia into completing the dam under "Version

C," which would be the most costly solution for Hungary, foreign affairs state secretary Tamas Katona said.

Under Version C, accepted by the Slovak government last January, the hydropower system could be put into operation in 1992—even if Hungary rejects a joint construction plan.

A mutually acceptable solution can be found only through negotiations sought with international participation.

Hungary's unilateral move may embitter Hungarian-Slovak relations for decades. The Hungarian government should patiently continue to seek a solution, Katona said.

The discussion was finally adjourned.

Military Expert Views Relations With Neighbors

*AU1003140092 Budapest NEPSZAVA
in Hungarian 6 Mar 92 p 3*

[Interview with Laszlo Szegedi, expert at the Security Policy and Defense Research Center, by Katalin Decsi; place and date not given: "Balanced Military Relations With Our Neighbors"]

[Text] Hungarian-Romanian relations are balanced and harmonized—this is a familiar statement and, this time, it was said on the occasion of the visit to Bucharest of Defense Ministry State Secretary Antal Annus. The same qualifications are not used very often in diplomatic relations. What is the reason for this peculiar situation? We interviewed Laszlo Szegedi.

[Szegedi] Military relations are only a part of bilateral relations. These relations are not new because, for decades, the military leadership has been trying to maintain as normalized as possible relations between the military forces of Hungary and Romania. On one hand, the high military leadership has direct links on the level of chief of staff at the ministries and, on the other, good contacts have also been formed on the middle level.

Recently, within the framework of the Open Skies agreement that we first signed with Romania, the opportunity has been given for direct inspection. In addition, in the framework of the bilateral military agreement, in given circumstances, troops stationed close to the border can maintain direct contact with each other.

The military area is one of the important sources of possible conflict and therefore it has an outstandingly important role because good relations can contribute to eliminating the use of weapons.

[Decsi] Does this mean that our soldiers are better politicians than our diplomats?

[Szegedi] Debates might exist in the political sphere but this does not mean that the various sections cannot work well together. As far as I know, bilateral economic relations are also balanced.

Rather than being involved in politics, the main tasks of our soldiers are to maintain military and professional relations, for example to consult with each other on operational and tactical issues, training matters, the principles of the Open Skies, and other matters. This is also politics, but it is not big politics. However, these areas of relations also affect the general political situation. This is precisely the reason the military leadership places great emphasis on this area because good partial areas of relations contribute to the improvement of bilateral relations and strengthening trust. The latest visit to Bucharest also served this purpose.

[Decsi] Are our relations just as harmonious with the defense leadership of the other neighboring countries?

[Szegedi] We have bilateral military agreements with virtually all our neighbors. I would say that our relations are normalized and balanced. In fact, I could say the same in the case of Yugoslavia, too. In 1991, when the conflict arose, the appropriate level leaders of the two armies had an opportunity to take up contact and discuss the problem. For example, during the violations of our airspace, the flight chiefs of the two armies came together to discuss how such events could be prevented. In other words, our relations are good with everyone in our surroundings.

Battalion To Join UN SFRY Peace Force

*LD1003222892 Warsaw PAP in English
2139 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 10—The Polish Government received Tuesday an official invitation from the United Nations secretary general to take part in the UN peace keeping mission in Yugoslavia.

The Polish Government accepted on the same day the motion of the ministers of national defence and internal affairs to send a Polish military contingent and a group of police to Yugoslavia. Following President Lech Walesa's recommendation, the Polish battalion would be composed of volunteers only. The national defence minister already decided to form such a battalion.

Government spokesman Marcin Gugulski said the whole undertaking would be financed from the state budgetary reserves.

Skubiszewski on North Atlantic Council Debates

*LD1103042992 Warsaw PAP in English
2344 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 10—Upon his return from the Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council Poland's Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski said that the debates were very successful and essential from the point of view of the Polish foreign policy of linking Poland with the North Atlantic alliance.

Cooperation within the council after the body was joined by eleven ex-Soviet countries poses new tasks before its members. Skubiszewski is of the opinion that Poland's experience may be useful in this respect because this country has already developed bilateral cooperation with the NATO. The Polish side suggested that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council created regional centres that would deal with concrete programmes.

Skubiszewski said the North Atlantic Cooperation Council will not be linked with the recently established Council of the Baltic Countries. The latter will cooperate in the field of security with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and form a certain regional system within it.

During his stay in Brussels Minister Skubiszewski met with his Lithuanian counterpart Algirdas Saudergas to discuss the controversial issue of textbooks in Polish schools in Lithuania.

Lithuania Criticized for Withdrawing Books

*LD1003184292 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 1500 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Members of the Sejm commission for liaison with Poles abroad have ruled that the decision by Lithuanian education authorities to withdraw from schools handbooks published abroad is against the rights of ethnic minorities and thus the rights of the Polish minority.

According to deputies, this decision contravenes provisions of the Polish-Lithuanian declaration as well as international conventions concerning the rights and duties of ethnic minorities.

Foreign Ministry Expresses 'Concern'

*LD0903212992 Warsaw PAP in English
1923 GMT 9 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 9—The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Monday its concern about the decision of the Lithuanian Ministry of Culture and Education concerning the withdrawal of textbooks issued in Poland from Polish schools in Lithuania.

The Foreign Ministry recalls that education authorities of both Poland and Lithuania reached an agreement on February 21 under which a special bilateral commission for history textbooks was to be set up.

The ministry also points to the fact that in the transition period, the Lithuanian schools in Poland are allowed to use textbooks printed in Lithuania and expresses hope that the Lithuanian side will adopt a similar attitude.

Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski labeled as "necessity for today" the issue of providing Polish youth living in Lithuania with adequate textbooks enabling proper perception of the Polish history and culture. The minister also said that "there can be no obstacles in reliable and honest teaching of Polish youth in Lithuania."

Lithuania Signs Agreement on Air Transportation

*LD1003205892 Warsaw PAP in English
1912 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 10—Chief Inspector of Civil Aviation Adam Berezowski reported Tuesday, after a Polish delegation visit to Vilnius, that Poland and Lithuania had initialled a long-term agreement on cooperation in air transportation.

However, according to Berezowski, no development in aviation connections between Poland and Lithuania should be expected within the coming months.

Tusk Elected Chairman of Liberal Democrats

*LD1003183692 Warsaw PAP in English
1610 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 10—Janusz Lewandowski was elected vice-chairman and Krzysztof Zabinski—secretary-general of the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KL-D) at a session of the congress' national board in Warsaw Tuesday. Donald Tusk was chosen chairman of the party during the third national congress of the KL-D two weeks ago.

Declines Joining Coalition*LD1003221192 Warsaw PAP in English
2106 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 10—Leader of the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) Donald Tusk stated on Tuesday his party did not consider it possible to hold serious talks on including liberals in the ruling coalition before they accepted the budget bill.

According to Tusk the KLD might start such talks only if the government promised to take up more radical measures to counter inflation, considered the greatest danger for Polish economy by the party. However, the economic concepts of the government have shifted from the anti-inflationary policy to anti-recessionary one, which is unacceptable to the KLD, he stated.

Tusk declined to comment on the proposal by leader of the Centre Alliance (PC) Jaroslaw Kaczynski to broaden the coalition with the Democratic Union (UD). "Firstly, at present Kaczynski's influence on changes in the ruling base is slight, secondly, he stressed on numerous occasions that the PC, the UD, and the KLD should make the core of a ruling coalition," Tusk said.

He ruled out any alliance of liberals with the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) saying the latter party did not treat seriously budgetary issues, crucial in forming any ruling coalition.

Speaking after a meeting of the KLD national board, Donald Tusk opined that fast changes on the Polish political scene had created the situation in which "practically no politician is able to answer who may cooperate with whom and why in today's Poland."

The board elected Janusz Lewandowski KLD vice-chairman and Krzysztof Zabinski secretary general. Donald Tusk was re-elected KLD leader two weeks ago.

Government Debates Privatization*LD1003232992 Warsaw PAP in English
2223 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Warsaw, March 10—At its meeting here Tuesday, the Council of Ministers decided to set up an interministerial team which will draft the final version of the programme of privatisation and reprivatization. The team, headed by acting minister for ownership changes Tomasz Gruszecki, is to submit a draft law on reprivatization in less than two weeks' time.

President Lech Walesa, who attended the government debate on privatisation, said that a major problem awaiting resolution was the absence of a master plan of privatisation. He said it was imperative to determine the scale and areas where the treasury would remain the owner of production and other assets, and other fields, where state ownership would be partial or eliminated by privatisation.

Prime Minister Jan Olszewski pointed to the importance of socio-economic and legal stability in Poland for the inflow of foreign capital. Government spokesman Marcin Gugulski told a press conference after the meeting that ownership changes in Poland "must involve foreign capital participation" without which the restructuring of industry was hard to imagine. Gugulski also said that reprivatization, that is returning to former owners their unlawfully seized property, must be radically speeded up.

In the second part of the meeting today, the government adopted three draft laws on inventions and patent protection. The drafts amend Polish legislation making it fully compatible with Western European standards. The changes were made necessary by the provisions of the Polish-U.S. treaty and Poland's negotiations on association with the EC. Finally, the Council of Ministers adopted a draft law ratifying the 1950 Rome Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The ratification is a condition of accession to the Council of Europe. The convention lists the rights and provides for a mechanism of their effective defense by lodging complaints with the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Tribunal of Human Rights.

Reaction to Defeat of Economic Program**'Surprise' at Outcome of Vote***AU1103103092 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 6 Mar 92 p 1*

[Untitled commentary by RZECZPOSPOLITA editor in chief Dariusz Fikus]

[Text] By 33 votes, the Sejm has rejected the principles of government socioeconomic policy for 1992. One hundred and seventy-one deputies voted against the program, 138 in favor, 38 abstained, and 114 were absent. REUTER has said this could mean the end of Jan Olszewski's center-rightwing government, which has been in office for two months. Polish politicians are more optimistic. Those who voted for the program late on Tuesday evening said that the government would not step down. Even those who voted against the program said in the corridors that the government was unlikely to step down. On the contrary, they said, the government would have an easier job now, for the socioeconomic program would no longer stand in the way of its work on the budget. But this is just speculation, for if the government has no socioeconomic program, how can it produce a budget?

The situation can develop in several ways. The government may offer to stand down but the Sejm will reject the offer, or the government will offer to stand down and the Sejm will accept the offer, or the government will not stand down but will continue to work on the budget, which must be ready by the end of March. Each of these scenarios is possible.

So much for the facts. The rejection of the government's program took almost everyone by surprise, for the outcome was not clear until the very end. The two radical parties, the Alliance of the Democratic Left and Confederation of Independent Poland [KPN], displayed an indecisive stance. Both parties voted against the program, even though the KPN had suggested amendments to it, and these suggestions had been incorporated in the final document. The KPN was discouraged by the new finance minister's speech, which was considered unsatisfactory; excessively monetarist and pro-market. The Democratic Union voted against the program for exactly the opposite reason. It considered the program to be insufficiently reformist. Therefore the program was rejected for two contrasting reasons. That does not augur well for the state. A state cannot function with a weak government that has no stable parliamentary backing. A stronger government is required, hence all the attempts to expand the coalition. The president also has influence over the situation. He is now wreaking vengeance upon the drawing-room relationships where it is not the country that matters, but positions and privileges. Society is tired of this game of pretense, but while the game is on, it must be played to the very end. The government should conclude its work on the budget and defend its policies.

Government Stepping Down Considered

AU1103105192 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 6 Mar 92 p 1

[K. Gr.' report: "Will The Government Resign?"]

[Text] "The government has found itself in a difficult situation just like parliament and society, but it will not resign," said Foreign Trade Minister Adam Glapinski. Government Spokesman Marcin Gugulski said last Thursday that the government would resign if the Sejm voted against its socioeconomic program.

"The government does not have to resign if the Sejm rejects its program," said Andrzej Drzycimski, the president's spokesman. Notwithstanding this result, the government may still present its budget in the Sejm, and the Sejm might still pass it, he said.

"By voting against the program, the Democratic Union did not vote for the demise of the government," said Andrzej Potocki, Democratic Union spokesman. "The government should not resign, but should view the outcome of the vote as a need to alter its style. It is essential to alter the government coalition, one way of doing so is by adding the Democratic Union and Liberal-Democratic Congress to it." Potocki thinks that the rejection of the program has placed the government in a good situation because it is "no longer encumbered by this bad document."

Donald Tusk of the Liberal-Democratic Congress said that the government should "remain calm and remain in office." All four parties who voted against the program did so for different reasons, he said. In the case of the

Confederation of Independent Poland [KPN], it was obvious that the KPN had been waiting for an offer from the prime minister, and its support for the program was conditional upon that offer. "We in the Liberal-Democratic Congress always thought the socioeconomic program unnecessary. The budget is more important. If the socioeconomic program had been rejected straightaway, the government would have had more time to construct a proper budget," said Tusk.

Krzysztof Krol of the KPN does not think the government will resign. He said that the KPN had decided to vote against the program after hearing Finance Minister Andrzej Olechowski's speech. "We interpreted that as a continuation of Balcerowicz's repressive monetary policy," he said. "The socioeconomic program itself is not as bad as it was under the previous liberal government."

"I suggest we refrain from panicking," said Aleksander Kwasniewski of the Alliance of the Democratic Left [SLD]. "The government can carry on in office and prepare the budget. The real problem is the collapse of the grand coalition. He said that the SLD voted against the program because the SLD's motion to abolish tax on supernumerary wages in state enterprises had been rejected.

Jan Rulewski of Solidarity described the Sejm vote as a "semi-vote of no confidence in the government."

Jaroslaw Kaczynski of the Center Accord, which voted in favor of the program, is convinced the government will stay on, though he reiterated that the government cannot govern with the kind of parliamentary backing it has at present. "The government's weakness is encouraging activity aimed at changing it, and the KPN and SLD might be interested in doing so. Today's events could mean that democracy is in danger."

Walesa Comments on Current Challenges, Future

LD1103121692 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1840 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by correspondent Urmas Ott, place and date not given—recorded; Walesa in Polish with superimposed Russian translation]

[Excerpts] [Ott] Mr. President, we are very pleased to welcome you to our program "Television Acquaintance-ship". You have been here in the presidential palace as president of Poland for 15 months. What has this time meant for you—disappointment, hell, or paradise?

[Walesa] Let me say briefly that this has been a great hell for me and we have even greater hell ahead of us. We decided to carry out a great revolution and we turned out to be poorly prepared. However, under the old system everything somehow kept rolling along, somehow, but on

different principles and it produced results. Now we are moving in the opposite direction. All of this is breaking down, all of this has not been prepared. We must recreate production cooperation in this life. This is a vast task and I think that as newcomers to this task we made some mistakes. And other countries, including your countries, should draw conclusions from this. They must do more to explain to the people that what we are doing is to establish a different direction and that things must get a bit worse in order to get better. [passage omitted]

[Walesa] In spite of everything, it is simpler to be against; it is simpler to fight than simply to work well. And of course our situation was complicated. It would have been better for us if you had been the first or if you had given us a bit of time and followed after us a bit later in implementing reforms. But we all began our reforms and it turned out a total farce.

We were cooperating with your great country and with other countries and suddenly all of this collapsed. We do not have time to reorientate or to find markets and we reached chaos together. But could it have been otherwise? That is the question. The intellectual level of your society and our society is comparable with that of the Western countries. If we approach these processes consciously, if there is more understanding there will be less trickery and more solidarity and we shall obtain results more quickly.

It is necessary to prove to everyone everywhere that the principles that we wish to be guided by and the models which we want to follow have already been tested in the world and things will be the same in our country. It just needs a bit of time and a bit of understanding—and even a bit of going back, to cooperation for example. That is why I supported Gorbachev to the end. Because I wanted to preserve cooperation, primarily economic cooperation, so that this autonomy should take place wisely, by means of economic restructuring. I wanted this to take place on the basis of calculations and not on the basis of revolution. It would have been possible to do it that way but only when more people earned their living from agriculture. Then people would have coped somehow and would have been fed.

But when we have many enterprises, a vast degree of production cooperation, the destruction of these links must of course lead to chaos.

Both we and you chose the very worst variant of those possible. But now we do not have any way back. Now it is necessary, by means of influencing people's consciousness, to prove correctness and to achieve greater solidarity and move on further. [passage omitted]

[Ott] Mr. Walesa, what are your relations with Poland's former leaders? For example, with Mr. Gierk and with General Jaruzelski?

[Walesa] At the moment we do not have any particular contact. In fact, none at all. But in the future, when we put prices in order and when everything starts rolling, I

think that people should be assessed for the work they have done—their limitations and historical context should be considered so that each should receive a particular reward for their work and the respect they deserve without malice because it is necessary to judge fairly. Everyone has made mistakes and continues to make them. But as I said, it is necessary to see all of this in context.

So I think that in the future I shall have contacts with both Gierk and with Jaruzelski and we shall all work for the good of the country. Of course, history will decide other questions. And the procuracy, too, if anything is found on this level. I do not go into these things. I am not a procurator or a historian. But from the human point of view and from the point of view of possible use to the country, I shall take account of various options.

[Ott] Mr. President, I was extremely amazed that at times, on some questions, you consult former Polish leader General Jaruzelski. Is this so?

[Walesa] This is rather complicated. Of course, on military questions and on other questions—and also for experience because General Jaruzelski is more experienced. I think that you mean the time when that great danger arose in your country [the August coup]. At that time I telephoned for two reasons: I could suspect that this could be an international plot and therefore I was giving a warning. I said: I am the president and I don't want any action behind my back. And of course I expressed that opinion. And also the other opinion that what was happening in the Soviet Union was a matter for the Soviet Union. We do not interfere, none of us interferes in these questions. If there were some opinions in our country, then we would with pleasure listen to them so as not to make any mistakes. That is, these were interconnected.

But fate decreed that I have been given power and I must foresee many options. Therefore, for the good things he could convey to me and for the warning that the people over whom he has influence should not by chance try to play out some intrigues behind my back and not forget that I am president, so that I do not cause them additional unpleasantnesses. I think that I was correctly understood. I cannot rebuke the general for anything on these two concepts. [passage omitted]

[Ott] Mr. President, who is the ideologist here in Poland now? Is this your ideology, the president's ideology, or is it the ideology of your advisers?

[Walesa] No. Of course, I listen to many people. Sometimes the professor is right and sometimes the man in the street, even a child. It is only necessary to be able to draw the correct conclusions. And it is correct when you understand and when you are convinced of something. [passage omitted]

[Ott] Mr. President, as you have already said, you have been in the post of president of the Polish Republic for 15 months. That means that you have fairly frequent

contacts with other great people of the world. With which of them are you closest, in purely human terms? Which of them is it the greatest pleasure to meet?

[Walesa] There are many great people in the world, each in their own sphere, each in their own conditions. I am convinced that, while I am president in Poland, I will not be able to do anything in the Soviet Union, and I know for sure that the great President Bush would not cope as president in the Soviet Union, or in Poland. But he is a great man in his class, and he is irreplaceable. Just as I am irreplaceable, or President Yeltsin, who would not cope with the U.S. Presidency. That is, to classify things in a different way: I know that if he were in this place, I know he would somehow end up in this job. We talk about a lot of issues that we try to resolve for our own countries, and for ourselves, to expand our mental horizons, our understanding.

As I say, there are many masters, many great people. There is a great specialist in human relations, and my belief is that this is the pope. There is a great man, Bush, in the United States, and a great man in the Soviet Union, the former Soviet Union, Gorbachev; there is the great man, Yeltsin. There are very many, varied great people. [passage omitted]

[Ott] Mr. President, one question to which you know the answer and I do not: what is the taste of power like?

[Walesa] For a normal person, it is terrible, but for a pervert, it is probably OK. To speak of democracy once

again, it is democracy that maintains a balance, and restricts the term of office. I am in favor of a limited term. I am in favor of replacability. I am in favor of people not spoiling their lives, and of power having an airing. I am amazed when someone or other is in charge for 20 years. That is terrible. More than two terms is wrong. Something like eight years is the maximum; then, clear off and give others a chance. This is both good for the individual's health and good for society. And this is something I will be fighting for. [passage omitted]

[Ott] Mr. President, you are probably at the peak of your career. You are the president of the country. Do you sometimes worry about the future?

[Walesa] Of course. Now I can only go down, there is no going higher, and I know that. But I would prefer to have a parachute as I fall! And that is obvious for me. Of course, an athlete departs when he is at his strongest, but I don't know, I know general things. I want to build a system, and the way it is now is this: Either I win both things, that is, both the system that I am building, and then I win my own position; or perhaps it is different, I could win the system and lose myself, because when democracy is too great, then some big, strong party emerges and has its own candidate, and I get kicked out, and regardless of the fact that I did the right thing in building, I still lose; or the third variation—I don't build the system, and also lose. That is, I know all the possibilities. How it turns out does not depend on me alone. [passage omitted]

Iliescu, Party Leaders Discuss Elections*AU1003200292 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1843 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 10/3/1992—Tuesday [10 March] afternoon Romania's President Ion Iliescu invited at the Cotroceni Palace leaders of the political parties represented in Romania's Parliament to hold talks on the future legislative and presidential elections. Approach was also made of general problems of the Romanian economy, opinions being changed in connection with the latest events in the country.

The talk started with an appreciation of the recent local elections characterized by Romania's president as "an exam of maturity". Aspects were then discussed concerning the financing of the election campaign for the next general elections.

The talk did not end with a convergence of all opinions as regards the simultaneity of the parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania. The majority of the participants in the talks agreed with the necessity of legislative elections at the set term, that is no later than June. To this end the parliament was asked to finalize the legislative acts as soon as possible.

The meeting at the Cotroceni Palace was attended by the president of the Senate, Alexandru Birladeanu, by the speaker of the Assembly of Deputies, Dan Martian, by Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan, the National Salvation Front Leader, the presidents of the National Liberal Party, of the Romanian Social Democratic Party, of the Romanian Ecological Party, of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, of the Romanian National Unity Party, of the Liberal Party, of the Free Change Party, of the Agrarian Democratic Party, of the Bratianu Liberal Union, of the Traditional Social Democratic Party, as well as by executives of the Christian Democratic National Peasant Party.

Iliescu Reviews Meeting*AU1003215592 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 2000 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Interview with Romanian President Ion Iliescu by Calin Petrescu in Bucharest on 10 March—recorded]

[Text] [Petrescu] After the discussions held with the representatives of political parties and hearing the opinions expressed by them, how do you view tonight's discussions?

[Iliescu] You were present from the beginning to the end of the talks, so I believe that you share my viewpoint that the discussions were useful and constructive and were held in a civilized manner. This is a continuation of the permanent dialogue we hold with the leaders of political parties. As a matter of fact, the dialogue was extended a little because we entered the electoral period, started elections, and we did not have time for them. As you could witness, three subjects were discussed. I consider

that the discussions held on the respective subjects were positive. The major issue was the organization of general—parliamentary and presidential—elections. This was not the appropriate framework to draw conclusions. We have met here in a consultative framework in which we try to listen to the opinions of parties and ensure as much as possible a consensus or a positive rapprochement on certain issues. Thus, on the first issue, we tried to discover the options and opinions in connection with the elections, the date for the elections, and the necessary conditions to organize them. You saw what the predominant line was. I think a conclusion will emerge, namely that it is necessary not to drag out too long the date for general elections. Certainly the parliament will have to have its say; the two laws will have to be adopted. I believe that we have to make these efforts and make possible the organization of these elections during the month of June. I do not want to repeat the arguments expressed during the discussions.

The other two subjects had an informational character. On behalf of the government, a picture of our current economic situation was presented as was information about the situation in Transdnestria and the contacts we have with Moldova's leadership about this issue.

Iliescu, Roman Reportedly Discuss Election 6 Mar*AU1003133792 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 6 Mar 92 p 1*

[“AM PRESS” note: “Iliescu-Roman Meeting”]

[Text] Cotroceni Palace sources have informed AM PRESS independent news agency that on 4 March a half-hour meeting took place between President Iliescu and National Salvation Front [FSN] leader Petre Roman. According to the same unofficial sources, the meeting was preceded by a phone call made by the “extremely irritated and nervous” president to FSN headquarters. Calling Roman to Cotroceni Palace seems to have little to do with a reconciliation and more with the need to find out whether the FSN is still going to endorse the candidacy of president Iliescu in the coming elections. The FSN leader apparently refused to comment on the issue, passing the responsibility over to the next democratic forum of the FSN, which is tantamount to a refusal. The presidential press office, in charge of informing the press and, thus, public opinion, did not mention a word about this meeting.

Iliescu Adviser Opposes Postponement of Election*AU1003143592 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1310 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 10/3/1992—“I don't think the Romanian economy stands no chance of recovery, especially at a time when the property status has changed” Presidential Adviser Iosif Boda tells the liberal-oriented daily “VIITORUL ROMANESC.” How can we emerge from the paradoxical situation “of being poor people in a country that would hardly be described

as poor?" is a question "that the authority returned by the upcoming legislative elections will have to answer," Mr. Boda reckons. "Whoever can answer that question, and secure popular support and understanding will command a ruling position on Romania's political stage for at least ten years" President Ion Iliescu's adviser says.

Stressing that postponement of the general election scheduled for this May or June "is undesirable," Iosif Boda says that in his opinion "economic reform in Romania" should be conceived also as self-reformation, extending to all segments of society."

According to him, Romania's political forces are fairly well balanced and "any government resulting from the future legislative elections will have to consider the existing local power centres—in Bucharest and elsewhere in the country." However, Mr. Boda said he believed the desire for cooperation would "prevail over inherent differences."

On a possible cooperation between the National Salvation Front and liberals, Iosif Boda said that in his opinion that "would be a factor of equilibrium and added: "A fast and noisy dissolution of the Front cannot be to the liking of the Democratic Convention as a whole either. A void would result and a very wide channel would be formed allowing a comeback of extreme leftists. Nor can the threat of a revival of the extreme right be dismissed," the presidential adviser also said.

Roman Explains Deterioration of FSN Position

AU1003102492 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
0912 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 10/10/1992—Explaining in an interview with the daily "TINERETUL LIBER" the results obtained by the National Salvation Front [FSN] in the recent local elections, the national leader of the party, Petre Roman, says that the erosion of the position gained by the Front in the May 20 general elections are due, first of all, to the fact that the National Salvation Front governed during a period of transition and to the fact that, the big cities, where the Front lost the local elections, have borne the brunt of the transition, and "consequently people have been tempted by change."

The FSN leader also said that another thing that could have mattered was "the absence, sometimes, of clear solutions, in the Front's message, to the problems of the transition. The FSN prestige has also been eroded, in Mr. Roman's opinion, by FSN members, FSN parliamentarians having "incriminated" the former government (a FSN government including a few independents), that resigned in September 1990. "That is without precedent," mentioned Petre Roman, "and in political terms it makes no sense to be attacked by members of your own party."

In spite of all this, a feeling is prevailing that there are several trends, but one party," mentioned Petre Roman.

LNLD Members Urge Expulsion of Roman

AU1003153692 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER
in Romanian 4 Mar 92 p 2

[Dan Ion article: "Mr. Petre Roman Expelled, the National Salvation Front Abandoned!"]

[Excerpts] On 1 March, 150 members of the National League of December Fighters [LNLD] held a meeting in the former Central Committee building, to sum up their activity. The truths expressed in a loud manner—often in an unacademic way—by people destroyed emotionally, left jobless in the street, and even starving—the revolutionaries of '89!—were directed at the bankruptcy that is threatening Romania and the revolutionary associations. In this respect, Mr. Nicolae Blacioti, the president of the league, voiced strong accusations against the deplorable administration and the fact that foreign interests were put before the country's interests after the revolution; these accusations will be submitted to the legal bodies! [passage omitted]

In the last minute, the debates culminated with the announcement by the vice president, Adrian Staicu, that the league renounces the support of the National Salvation Front parliamentary group—Messrs. Dan Iosif, Cazimir Ionescu, Danut Fleaca and others—which is completely unproductive for the former comrades in arms and appeals to the protection of the National Liberal Party group! One hardly had time to blink when another bombshell exploded: the proposal to expel Mr. Petre Roman for lack of attendance and lack of activity within the league! Endorsed by a majority of votes, the apparent vendetta is still motivated by the lack of cooperation of the ex-premier, who could not find the time in 1990 and 1991 to see again and grant a location for headquarters to the friends he had in the Revolution! [passage omitted]

PSDIR Requests Willy Brandt's Aid in Moldova

AU1003200192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1907 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 10/3/1992—We request your support in sensitizing the Socialist International and its component parties over the serious situation created in the Republic of Moldova following the armed intervention of the Cossacks come from the Russian Federation and the Russian-speaking armed groups against the peaceful Romanian population, shows an appeal forwarded to Willy Brandt by the leadership of the Independent Social Democratic Party of Romania [PSDIR]. It is not an ethnic conflict, the appeal says, but an expression of the brutal imperial Russian force against the Romanians, with the clear intention of frightening and discouraging them, of thwarting their ideals of freedom and democracy.

Stolojan, World Bank Discuss 350 Million Loan

AU1003130292 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1226 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 10/3/1992—A World Bank mission, in Romania now to negotiate an agreement for \$350 million worth of a loan to be granted to Romania, was received Tuesday, March 10, by the Romanian premier, Theodor Stolojan. Details were tackled referring to the loan.

Mihai Bogza, director general at the Ministry of Economy and Finance, who attended the meeting, told the press the final negotiations would be held in Washington, in the month of April.

Nastase Leaves for North Atlantic Council Meeting

AU0803163692 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1439 GMT 8 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 8/3/1992—Romania's Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Nastase left Sunday, March 8, for Brussels, to attend a special sitting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, to be held on March 10, at the NATO headquarters.

The head of the Romanian diplomacy told the press before departure: "As the agenda of the sitting includes the admission as members of the Council of former Soviet republics, the Republic of Moldova will have an opportunity to express, for the first time in such a body, its point of view on its security and on other matters related to the partnership proposed by NATO to the countries that are members of the Council at present.

"We hope the sitting will offer a framework for an outlook to be developed on security in Europe, to ease the feeling of insecurity, of concern on the part of a number of countries, especially in the eastern part of the European continent, to reach by cooperation a form of partnership, regarding an issue essential for the national security of the states participating in the Council's sitting."

Before the meeting, answering an invitation of the "College Europeen" de Bruges, Mr. Nastase will deliver a lecture in front of the staff and the students of this university on the present state of Romania and the way in which this country sees European security.

Nicolae Titulescu's Remains Brought To Bucharest

AU0703192192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1744 GMT 7 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 7/3/1992—The plane with the mortal remains of the great Romanian diplomat and politician Nicolae Titulescu arrived in Bucharest from Paris.

The ceremony held at the Otopeni Airport on the occasion was attended by President Ion Iliescu of Romania, Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan, Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, the leaders of the two chambers of Parliament Alexandru Barladeanu and Dan Martian, Minister of Culture Ludovic Spiess, Bucharest Mayor General Crin Halaicu, France's Ambassador to Bucharest Renaud Vignal, other officials.

In his opening address Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase said: Nicolae Titulescu comes back home to rest in the soil of his ancestors, thus joining the so many heroes of this nation. Reminding two of Nicolae Titulescu's ideas—symbol—that his country belonged to Europe, a valuable Romanian heritage, and that future must be our making—the Romanian foreign minister said in conclusion: Now on his return home only by rallying together will we be able to build that future Nicolae Titulescu had dreamt of.

In his address Romania's President Ion Iliescu referred to the salient features of the thought and deed of the illustrious Romanian diplomat and jurist. "Nicolae Titulescu was and is for us, the Romanians, an example of love of the country to which he devoted his being, intelligence and capabilities, a model of cultivating and safeguarding Romania's national interests and, on a broader plane, of the commandments of European peace and security, with the refined tools of law and diplomacy which he took to perfection, Ion Iliescu said.

In his address the Romanian head of state pointed to the qualities of great patriot, great visionary and maybe the greatest European politician of his time. Ion Iliescu voiced his hope that this touching moment—the return of the mortal remains of a great son of the Romanian people after fifty years—would be an opportunity for the Romanian people to prove their national cohesion. He referred to the entire activity of the Romanian diplomat which was guided by the belief that in its foreign policy the country must show a single will imposed by the national interests, the vigour of the foreign policy actions depending directly on the solidity and cooperation of the political forces on a national plane. The Romanian president also expressed his belief that Titulescu's return to the Romanian soil would impart a new meaning to these bridges between generations which enrich the heritage of thinking and national feelings.

The solemn ceremony continued with a remembrance service performed by a group of priests at head with Romania's Patriarch Teoctist.

The coffin was taken to the Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry headquarters.

International

U.S., EC To Coordinate Policy on SFRY

AU1003194092 Belgrade RTB Television Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Report by Snezana Rodic in Brussels—recorded]

[Text] We have just received another report from our Brussels correspondent Snezana Rodic on the joint stand adopted tonight by the EC and the United States concerning the crisis in Yugoslavia.

[Rodic] At the end of talk between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and the EC foreign ministers in Brussels tonight, a joint declaration was adopted on the recognition of the Yugoslav republics.

The EC and the United States expressed firm support for the peace plan of the United Nations and the conference on Yugoslavia under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington and for the key principles aimed at finding a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. The declaration also states that the republican borders should not be changed by force, without a joint agreement, and that human rights of national and ethnic groups should be fully protected in all republics.

The EC and United States have agreed to coordinate their principles on ending the process of those Yugoslav republics seeking independence. Bearing in mind the declaration of 16 December, the United States and the EC agreed on the following: The United States will in this context positively review the demands for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, proceeding from the principle of the so-called double track [dupli kolosek]—the peace action by the United Nations and the conference on Yugoslavia. The United States and the EC will also coordinate their approach toward the will of Serbia and Montenegro, which have expressed the wish to form their own state and which particularly stressed their readiness to respect the territorial integrity of other republics and the rights of minorities on their territories, and their readiness to discuss the succession of the Yugoslav state on the basis of a consensus with other four republics. The demands for the recognition of the other two Yugoslav republics will also be positively reviewed. In this context the EC and the United States particularly insist that all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina adopt the constitutional arrangement that will provide them with a peaceful development of this republic within the existing borders.

UN Command Staff Reinforcements Arrive

LD1003174192 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1647 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, March 10 (TANJUG)—The command staff of the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia received reinforcements today. Twenty officers from Sweden landed in Belgrade and continued at once for

Sarajevo, the site of the peace operation's headquarters. Twelve members of the Norwegian contingent charged with air traffic control flew in on the same aircraft.

TANJUG has learned from the operational headquarters that they will stay in Belgrade for the time being. A reconnaissance-operational group of the U.N. peacekeeping force headed by Kenyan Army Brigadier-General Arab Rob, who will be the commander of the force's group "South," arrived in Knin today, Radio Knin said today.

Indian Army General Satish Nambiar, the commander of the peacekeeping force, together with 34 U.N. officers today flew from Belgrade to Graz and thence to Zagreb by road. Nambiar said on his arrival in Graz he hoped the U.N. troops would succeed fully in restoring the peace in Yugoslavia. The positioning of the blue helmets will take some time, but I hope it will be weeks rather than months, Nambiar said in a brief statement to the press in Graz.

He said that the precise start of the troops' deployment was still to be established, and that this would be discussed in Zagreb. General Nambiar's spokesman said later that the entire positioning operation was expected to be completed by the end of April. After Zagreb General Nambiar and his officers will travel to Sarajevo, the site of UNPROFOR's headquarters.

Interrepublic

Slovenia Considers Entry Visas

AU1003173892 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Report by Dragoslav Kosaric, place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] While the talks are being held on the political settlement of the Yugoslav crisis in Brussels, Slovenia is planning to introduce entry visas for three Yugoslav republics, including Serbia. Dragoslav Kosaric has the details:

[Kosaric] The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Slovenia has recently sent to the Commission for International Relations of the Slovene parliament a list of the countries with which this republic should sign an agreement on abolishing visas. So far this has been agreed upon with Germany, Finland, and Sweden. The Slovenes expect to do the same with Italy, Austria, and Portugal soon.

As far as the Yugoslav republics are concerned, Croatia and Macedonia are the only ones among the 40 states with which Slovenia plans to abolish visas. Agreements, this confidential document points out, would be reached on the basis of the general approval by the Assembly Commission for International Relations and the Government of Slovenia.

It is interesting that the document does not use the word Yugoslavia, which still encompasses four republics. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Slovenia holds the view that an agreement with Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina should be reached on the basis of the Slovene Law on Foreigners. The Slovenes obviously intend to offer the agreement only to the republics and not the state of Yugoslavia, which, whether one admits it or not, still exists.

It is difficult to believe that the federal organs would accept such a proposal. This is why the proposal states already now that if Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro do not express interest in this, Slovenia will, after 30 days from informing them in writing, I quote, require from the citizens of these republics to have entry visas. The method of the *fait-accompli* can come back as a boomerang. If this proposal is adopted, it will, no doubt, be yet another step that contravenes the international convention on free flow of people, capital, and goods in the Balkans.

Slovene-Croatian Relations Improving

92BA0586A Ljubljana DELO
in Slovene 25 Feb 92 p 6

[Article by Romana Dobnikar-Seruga: "Something Has Nevertheless Begun To Change"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] Croatian-Slovene relations; several unresolved issues still exist, but each side is giving priority to other topics; an agreement on border cooperation is being prepared.

Ljubljana, 24 February—"It is still too early to answer the question of whether relations between Slovenia and Croatia have improved, since relations between the states are complex and complicated, partly because of the legal vacuum that has arisen. We think that we have nevertheless started to solve the problems by signing two important agreements on 6 February." With these words, Deputy Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler opened today's discussion by the Assembly Commission on International Relations of Slovenia's relations with its southern neighbor.

In its report on Slovene-Croatian relations, the Foreign Ministry listed all the disputed issues, analyzed current relations, and listed several bilateral agreements that should be concluded. Among the disputed issues are the failure to implement the agreement on payment transactions, the mutual dissatisfaction in connection with the Zagreb branch of the Ljubljana Bank, the Krsko nuclear power plant, the financing of the Osimo roads (the Croats are proposing a division of the obligations in a ratio that does not match the number of Italians who have emigrated from that individual republic), the designation of the state border at sea, the issue of fishing by Slovene fishermen, the issue of taking care of refugees and their return, several unresolved problems in the area of health care and social security, pension insurance and

employment relations, problems in connection with the Grubelic scandal and the bankruptcy of Elan, and the issue of the jurisdiction of the Croatian Catholic Church (e.g., the Zakrizje village).

The report notes self-critically that both sides lack a comprehensive strategy concerning what they want to achieve through negotiation; in this regard, the fact that both sides are giving priority to other issues is particularly important. Thus, Slovene politicians "care most" about collecting payment for debts, preserving the Croatian market, and protecting the property rights of Slovene legal and physical persons in Croatia, whereas what is most important to Croatia is support for it in the war, ensuring transportation connections with Europe, a satisfactory settlement of the Elan and Trend scandals for Croats who suffered losses, etc.

During the discussion, Borut Pahor (SDP [Party of Democratic Reform]), thought that we had underestimated the problem of cooperation with Croatia for a long time, and he supported the government's efforts to enter a phase of normal good-neighborly cooperation with that state. Slovenia, through its mediation, can help to establish peace in the Balkans, since only then will it promote its own comparative advantages in Europe over the other Yugoslav states, he also added. The government has tried to do more, stated Deputy Prime Minister Andrej Ocvirk, but the Croatian government has had to deal more with war issues, and relations with us were of secondary concern to it. Several deputies pointed out the serious difficulties of people living on the new border between the states, and called upon the government to "come down and deal as well with these matters, which are not high policy" (Rudi Seligo, DS [Democratic Party]).

In connection with this, Matjaz Jancar of the Foreign Ministry explained that they are already preparing an agreement on border traffic and border economic cooperation with Croatia, through which several extremely important problems in connection with crossing the border should be solved for the population living along it, for people with property on both sides, and daily migrant workers (and also tourists in the border areas), the supply of water and electricity, enterprises with facilities on both sides of the border, tourist cooperation, etc. According to Jancar's assurances, crossing the border is to be simplified as much as possible, but at the same time, the number of people authorized, the opstinas, and the subject areas to which the local border regime would apply should be expanded as much as possible. It should include all the coastal opstinas, for the sake of the Italian minority.

Joze Smole (SSS [Socialist Party of Slovenia]) proposed that the position of the Slovene minority in Croatia be added to the list of unresolved issues. Barbara Zupanc (LDS [Liberal Democratic Party]) requested information from the Defense Ministry about possible Slovene arms shipments to Croatia.

[Box, p 6]

The Assembly Commission on International Relations also discussed a package of three intergovernmental agreements with Macedonia (on economic cooperation, commodity trade in 1992, and a payment agreement), which are to be signed tomorrow. As Macedonia has proposed, trade between the two states will not proceed on the basis of nonresidential accounts, but rather on the basis of commodity lists, which very broadly define industries and not individual products.

Federal

Kostic on New Yugoslavia, Division of Bosnia

92BA0606A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
28 Feb 92 p 14

[Interview with Branko Kostic, vice president of the Yugoslav Presidency, by Nikola Ivanovic; place and date not given: "Backbone of the Balkans"—first paragraph is NIN introduction]

[Text] "By advocating Montenegro as part of Yugoslavia, I am not advocating a Greater Serbia, but rather a Greater Montenegro...."

Under today's dramatic circumstances, Branko Kostic, the vice president of the Yugoslav Presidency, is one of those rare politicians who has recognized the importance of the mass media. He readily agreed to an interview with NIN, and we talked about the new Yugoslavia and the European conspiracy, about the pitfalls of double standards, about differences concerning the Montenegrin referendum and points of contention with Serbia, about the final outcome of political events in B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina], about the members of the Presidency, about Macedonia as a sovereign and fleeced state, about Izetbegovic and the threatened outlet to the sea, about Montenegrin separatists and demonstrations in Belgrade.

[Ivanovic] It is odd that what were until recently the mouthpieces of those persons advocating the breakup of Yugoslavia are now announcing to the same public that Yugoslavia is a reality. Did Serbia and Montenegro lay the foundation for this reality? What is the explanation for this?

[Kostic] The fundamental interest of Germany and Austria was satisfied through the secession of Croatia and Slovenia and the recognition of those republics as independent states. Some points of contention are probably not critical to Germany. For example, the way in which the status of Serbian Krajina will be resolved, whether there will be respect for the will of the Serbs as well as the Croats, the extent to which they will remain under the protection of the United Nations, and whether they will join Yugoslavia or stay where they are.

[Ivanovic] Do you think that others will adopt that position as well?

[Kostic] The interest of a bloc of countries is something different. They are trying to continue with the dispersion of Yugoslavia. They are bothered by a Yugoslavia that would comprise Serbia and Montenegro, and potentially Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their desire is one thing, and our increasingly strong resistance is another thing. There is growing recognition by many countries that further insistence on the destruction of the country could result in more widespread Balkan conflict. It is my impression that Europe has finally realized that it can no longer insist on that approach while at the same time working to build peace.

[Ivanovic] Can it be called a "rump" Yugoslavia if it comprises Serbia and Montenegro?

[Kostic] What is left in Yugoslavia are those republics that created it and introduced its statehood in the joint sense in 1918. If, say, someone voluntarily leaves a family with several members, the family does not cease to exist. Thus, this is not a rump Yugoslavia. If they want to unilaterally "break free" from the broader family and be on their own, without us, then the question is whether they are essentially sovereign or in fact rump mini-states. Time will tell about this.

[Ivanovic] How realistic is it that a new Yugoslavia could be constituted and survive?

[Kostic] I cannot even imagine the citizens of Montenegro deciding in favor of a separate Montenegro in the referendum to be held shortly. It is quite clear that the majority will be in favor of a modern federation. At the same time, I expect that besides Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina will also join this Yugoslavia. Perhaps Macedonia as well, later on, if it is not first torn apart.

[Ivanovic] But certain conditions for constituting the federation have been controversial?

[Kostic] It is true that the conditions in the Draft Decision on the Referendum were too rigid and that some of them did not refer to the idea of forming a federal-type state. However, after two meetings that we had on the level of the state leadership in Belgrade and Titograd, all basic issues were ironed out. This means that it is completely certain that the federation will be constituted as a modern, federal state.

[Ivanovic] Some opposition parties in Serbia and Montenegro are insisting on independent states. Does this idea bring with it certain risks in terms of the fact that our neighbors are talking about adjustments in borders?

[Kostic] I think that this is a very short-sighted policy that does not take into account the common interest of Serbia and Montenegro in maintaining the continuity of the Yugoslav community of states. Naturally, the question of our neighbors' territorial pretensions could also be a topical issue. With their geostrategic position, Serbia and Montenegro remain not only the backbone of the Balkans, but also the largest state in this region. It

will not be possible for just anyone to whet their appetite on that sort of community of states.

[Ivanovic] A third of all Serbs live outside Serbia, and a third of all Montenegrins live outside Montenegro. Approximately one-fourth of all Muslims live outside Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Kostic] To a certain extent, Serbia and Montenegro are resolving that question by constituting a common state. It would be realistic to expect that any leadership of the Muslim nation would be interested in a new Yugoslavia. It is precisely the Muslims who, after the Serbs, are the most widely dispersed. Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a sovereign republic, as part of this type of community of states, in fact gains the opportunity for all Muslims living in B-H, Montenegro, and Serbia to be in one state.

[Ivanovic] Stipe Mesic and Janez Drnovsek have left the SFRY Presidency, followed by Vasil Tupurkovski, and Bogic Bogicevic is not attending its sessions. Whom did Bogic Bogicevic represent?

[Kostic] By leaving the Presidency, they wanted to eliminate the Army supreme command, which was their main obstacle in effecting their secessionist goals. Today, it is utterly clear that Drnovsek, Mesic, and Tupurkovski were following the same course. This could not be said of Bogicevic. I actually do not know for whom he was working, whose interests he was defending, and I believe that if you were to ask him, even he would not be able to answer that question.

[Ivanovic] The Army's "stop-and-go" tactics have yet to be fully explained to the public even today.

[Kostic] This was not at all a matter of blockades in the Presidency. The Presidency was against entering into a conflict with Slovenia for the simple reason that we were aware that such a blow would result in major destruction and heavy civilian casualties. We felt that no one should be kept in Yugoslavia by force. Nor was the Presidency constituted when Ante Markovic ordered that the Army be stopped. The fact that Tudjman has violated each one of the concluded cease-fires is a different issue.

[Ivanovic] Since Tudjman was unreliable in agreeing to cease-fires on 14 occasions, do you believe that he will obey the "blue helmets" who are preparing to arrive?

[Kostic] If the United Nations commits the "blue helmets," then I am utterly certain that they are the best guarantee of and protection for the Serb population from Ustashi paramilitary units, not so much through their weapons as through their authority. Tudjman has already encountered extremely strong pressure. From Germany most of all. And then from France and England, who have yielded to German pressure.

[Ivanovic] Is an attack on the Serbian nation in Croatia possible with the blessing of Rome, Vienna, and Bonn?

[Kostic] I think not. The "blue helmets" will defend the Serbian nation without meddling with the existing

organs of power, the police. They are independent in all regards. The negotiations, as well as the stationing of peacekeeping troops, will probably continue for a long time. However, they will have to finish with a plebiscite of that nation and their right to decide, based on self-determination, with whom they want to live.

[Ivanovic] It is indicative that some Austrian and German newspapers (STANDARD and KLEINE ZEITUNG) lately have been appealing to Europe to help Croatia regain "its" territory....

[Kostic] No matter how much the Croats arm themselves, they could never control the Serbian Krajina. Any such attempt would delay the arrival of the "blue helmets." There would be the threat of an escalation of the conflict. I hope that the European Community and world are aware of this.

[Ivanovic] Is it a mistake that Serbia and Montenegro have not recognized the Serbian Republic of Krajina?

[Kostic] This question is being raised a great deal by the public. There have also been many demands in the parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro for its recognition. However, if we, as Yugoslavia, have launched the peace initiative with the United Nations and we want to stop the war and seek a political solution, then we prejudice the outcome of the initiative that we ourselves have launched. On the other hand, we consider the Serbian Republic of Krajina to be part of Yugoslavia. Our recognition would not mean much if it does not gain international recognition. And it must gain that through the search for a political solution.

[Ivanovic] How do you explain the fact that the Germans get a republic in distant Russia more easily than the Serbs do in their own country?

[Kostic] The answer to that question is found in the balance of power in Europe. On today's political stage in this Old Continent, we are seeing to a large measure the rule of force, the rule of strength, but not the rule of law.

[Ivanovic] Alija Izetbegovic is counting on Serbian territory remaining in a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is that possible?

[Kostic] It clearly is not. Through this sort of policy, he could provoke conflict between Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia and beyond. I think that this would be a tragedy. The Muslims have no reason whatsoever for entering into that type of war with the Serbs. And it is not possible to impose the will of one nation on another one.

[Ivanovic] If Bosnia-Herzegovina becomes sovereign, is it possible to remove western Herzegovina from the political and military control of Zagreb?

[Kostic] If the Croats in western Herzegovina account for 90 percent of the ethnic composition, then no one can deny them the right to decide to live with their motherland in the final outcome of the Yugoslav political crisis. In the same way, no one can deny the Serbs in Krajina

this right. And I personally think that in the final political outcome this will be one of the solutions, which would mean the Croats in western Hercegovina living together with the motherland. But how and in what way this question will be resolved between borders, what will happen with Bosnia-Hercegovina and its outlet to the sea—this, I think, is a matter that will be on the agenda during the political talks. It will probably be possible to find acceptable solutions here.

[Ivanovic] They are not attacking barracks in Macedonia, but Macedonians, Serbs, and Montenegrins with a pro-Yugoslav orientation are under pressure.

[Kostic] I am simply surprised that the state leadership of Macedonia is stubbornly insisting on secession. I am almost certain that Macedonia will be dismembered. If that does not happen in a relatively short period of time, then I am certain it will return to us in Yugoslavia.

[Ivanovic] Can the Montenegrins lose Prevlaka in the political games?

[Kostic] I think that Yugoslavia will resolve that question with Croatia. That border must be adjusted, because Yugoslavia and Montenegro without Prevlaka would not have sovereignty on the sea.

[Ivanovic] Who in Montenegro is in favor of an independent state?

[Kostic] The first group comprises those who would not fight for it. Certain extremist leaders of Muslim organizations, and then certain extremist leaders of Albanian political parties who for many years now have been demanding the Albanian flag in Montenegro. But my dear Malesians have never demanded a different flag, but have always fought together with the Montenegrins, under the Montenegrin flag. This means that a sovereign Montenegro is being demanded by those who look across the border. And of the members of the Montenegrin nation, such a state is militantly advocated by certain minor groups gathered around the Liberal Alliance and the Federalist Movement, at least within the borders of the four districts of old Montenegro, which again, I believe, they would like to place under someone else's coattails. There have been other such attempts in the past.

[Ivanovic] Let us get back to dissent. Could the announced demonstrations in Belgrade be, as it is being said in some quarters, "internally incited" but "externally programmed"?

[Kostic] I see this disunity of the Serbian people and the unwillingness of political parties to place national interests above partisan interests in the most tragic terms. I believe that these rallies cannot result in the destabilization of power, but they could result in clashes and casualties by mere virtue of the fact that a large number of people are armed. Under these circumstances, the organizers of the demonstrations assume group responsibility for this. The current authorities have no reason

whatsoever to prevent these demonstrations, but I am convinced that these authorities must apply the law and measures of responsibility to the organizers of the demonstrations if they lead to conflict and disorder.

[Ivanovic] If certain parties are unwilling to place national interests above partisan ones, then who could help the situation right now?

[Kostic] The situation in Serbia is more complicated than in Montenegro. Simple appeals to a number of party leaders would not help to alleviate conflict. But one should not lose sight of the fact that Serbia and Belgrade have an elite of people active in scholarly, cultural, and civic affairs who do not have a party orientation. In these dramatic times, their influence is minor, because they have distanced themselves from everything. Their involvement in particular would be of great benefit, because they enjoy a great deal of esteem among the people. Also of great benefit would be the involvement of the Serbian Orthodox Church, aimed at achieving the unity of the Serbian nation in these dramatic times.

[Ivanovic] In Montenegro as well, there has once again been agitation and hesitation concerning the organization of the referendum.

[Kostic] It appears to me, even though there have previously been dilemmas and disagreements even within the ranks of the ruling party, that they have been practically eliminated in their entirety since the talks that were just completed in Titograd. If we want a modern federal state that would guarantee the equality of the republics, but also the equality of their citizens, then this is impossible in a unicameral Assembly.

[Ivanovic] If borders are the focal point of our disagreements, can we then say that the key to the conflict in fact lies in the initial mistakes of both Yugoslavias: The great Serbian poet and diplomat Jovan Ducic wrote as an expatriate during the war that a whole new beginning should have been made back on 6 January 1929, "because if you button up a vest wrong, you have to completely unbutton it before buttoning it up like it should be." After the war it was unbuttoned, and the way the Politburo rebuttoned it was even worse. During the old as well as the new Yugoslavia, the people were never asked.

[Kostic] On today's political scene, it is primarily the AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders that are being assailed, and with good reason. But it is those that are generationally closer that are being assailed. If 1918 were generationally closer to us, then by the same token we could attack King Alexander as well, because it is likely that mistakes were also made in defining and establishing those borders of the first Yugoslavia.

[Ivanovic] How would you respond to charges that through your work on the Presidency, you are betraying the interests of Montenegro and struggling for a Greater Serbia?

[Kostic] Those charges are being levelled by the militant and extremist opposition in Montenegro, which advocates a separate state. Their starting point is not humanism and the struggle for justice, but rather a purely nationalistic viewpoint. Because of the circumstances, I have the opportunity to fight for the rights of the threatened Serbian nation, but if any other nation in Yugoslavia were threatened through some situation, then I would fight to defend the interests of that nation in the same way. Lurking behind these charges is Serbophobia. By advocating Montenegro as part of Yugoslavia, I am not advocating a Greater Serbia, but rather a Greater Montenegro. Thus, a Montenegro within these borders. I am not being spared by the opposition in Serbia either.

[Ivanovic] To end our interview, I would like to ask you two personal questions that are marginal in terms of current politics. All leading Montenegrin political figures have been given new names. Why do they call you Branko Kockica [little cube]?

[Kostic] Prior to the well-known events of January in Montenegro, I was vice prime minister of the Republic. The entire government took a New Year's vacation in Rozaje, with their families. There were lots of children along. At the New Year's Eve party, the older people were seated in the rear and the children were in front. I forced myself on these children with various stories and jokes, and I told a number of jokes relating to what is happening in society. The children accepted me. We also played a game, and I taught the children how to chant slogans—"Go outside." That was when I got the name Branko Kockica. I think that the children accepted me and identified me with one of their television friends. But a number of my colleagues who were in the government went over to the "reformists," and I assume that they later revived that name.

[Ivanovic] A long time ago in Cetinje, you were physically attacked by members of the Liberal Alliance. Since then, they have only yelled at you, but no one dares to attack you again. Do you still go to Cetinje?

[Kostic] I do, and very often. After that attack, I was in Cetinje and was welcomed by an ovation in the hall of the Sports Center, because that is the real Cetinje. That was when we were having a promotion for our party.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Brussels Document on New Republic Organization
LD1103015292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1907 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Document submitted by Jose Cutilheiro and discussed at the closing meeting of the peace conference in Brussels, on 9 March: "Principles of the New Constitutional Organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[Text]

A. Independence

1. Bosnia-Herzegovina is to be a state composed of a number of constituent units formed along national principles. Economic, geographic, and other criteria will also be taken into account.

2. Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to remain within its existing borders. Neither the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina nor the governments of the constituent units will encourage or support the ambitions of neighboring states to lay claim to any part of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory.

3. Sovereignty rests with members of the Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian peoples and other peoples and nationalities who exercise it through their civic participation in the constituent units and the republic's central organs.

B. General Principles

1. Bosnia-Herzegovina and its constituent units will be governed in line with the following constitutional principles as they are understood and applied in principle in Western Europe's democratic countries and as they are laid down in a draft convention being discussed at the conference:

a. The highest standards of respect for human rights as the draft convention envisages; respect for private property, a market economy, and free enterprise;

b. General and equal right to vote, free elections, and secret ballots;

c. Freedom of political and trade union activities;

d. A secular state system with religious freedom and separation of church and the state, separation of competence between government departments, the rule of law, and a democratic and efficient system of control and of protecting constitutionality and legality;

e. International control and competency in the sphere of protecting human rights and freedoms.

C. The Assembly and Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1. Bosnia-Herzegovina's Assembly will be composed of a chamber of citizens, whose members will be elected directly, and a chamber of the constituent units, in which each constituent unit will have the same number of representatives.

2. By operating via the chamber of citizens and the chamber of constituent units and the government, the assembly will be empowered to adopt, discuss, and adjust proposals of the constituent units and to govern in the following spheres: central bank and monetary policies, foreign relations, general economic policies, and economic relations, including—if one of the following spheres relates to more than one constituent unit—

transport, power supply, oil pipelines, water distribution, and other issues requiring decisionmaking. The banner and coat of arms, higher education, religious matters, macroeconomic policies, important or strategic issues regarding economic policies, Bosnia-Herzegovina's relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina's neighboring countries, and other issues requiring decisionmaking will be decided by the chamber of constituent units by a majority vote of four-fifths of the total number of its representatives.

Note: Armed forces and police are to be discussed at a later stage.

3. The composition of employees in Bosnia-Herzegovina's state services and judiciary will be proportional to Bosnia-Herzegovina's national composition.

4. In order to resolve constitutional issues arising between the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the authorities of its constituent units, a special tribunal will be established in the framework of which unbiased individuals from outside Bosnia-Herzegovina and its neighboring countries will work for at least five years. This tribunal will include one member from each constituent unit and the same number of members plus one outside member. [sentence as received] The tribunal will decide by an absolute majority of votes.

D. Constituent Parts

1. Constituent units will be formed within the framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their definition is formulated in the following chapter "E".

2. The assembly and government of the constituent units, subject to Bosnia-Herzegovina's legislation within the limited range specified above and in line with the procedure presented above, will be empowered to pass legislation and decide on matters of importance for the constituent units; namely, managing a constituent unit's services and officials, appropriation of property in line with public interests, ordinance surveys, fire prevention, and chambers of commerce. They will be empowered to monitor cooperative trade organizations; building societies and credit institutions; charities; social security; health services; preservation of art and cultural heritage; cultural institutions such as libraries, institutes, and museums; and land management. They will be empowered to monitor protection of the environment, housing issues, markets, roads, emergency services, mining, hunting and fishing, natural resources, waterworks, water management, oil pipelines, transport within a constituent unit, tourism, agriculture, forestry, social aid, education, schools, police, trade and other aspects of economic policies, security measures at public functions, hygiene, sports and recreation, and other issues requiring decisionmaking. Each constituent unit will organize its own institutions. A constituent unit may establish and maintain links with other republics and organizations in them conditional upon these relations and links being in

keeping with the independence and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a federal state.

3. The composition of every institution (state services, judiciary, etc.) formed by a constituent unit will reflect its national composition.

4. A member of a minority nation in any given constituent unit will enjoy protection similar to that specified under Article Two, section three of the draft convention being discussed.

E. Definition of the Constituent Units

A working group will be formed and tasked with defining the territory of the constituent units on the basis of national principles, bearing in mind economic, geographic, and other criteria.

F. Transitional Moves

A constitutional law on changing the constitution will be prepared and submitted to the assembly as soon as possible, so as to facilitate the implementation of these principles.

[Dated] Brussels, 9 March 1992

Muslim, Croatian Parties Accept Document

LD0903173992 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1656 GMT 9 Mar 92

[Text] Brussels, 9 Mar (TANJUG)—Delegations of the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Community have expressed their readiness to accept a document on the principles of the future constitutional system of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was put forward by conference president Jose Cutilheiro. For its part, the Serbian Democratic Party sought a certain amount of time to consult its members about the document's contents.

This was announced officially in Brussels this afternoon following the conference's fourth session which, it is said, is being held in the framework of the peace conference on Yugoslavia.

According to a very brief statement, the Serbian Democratic Party delegation said that it is unable to accept the proposed document before it has had consultations with its party. The statement added that the party will inform the president of the conference about its response very soon. After this, he will convene a new round of talks in Sarajevo, the statement concludes.

Sarajevo Muslims Seek World Protection

LD1003184992 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1647 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Summary] Sarajevo, 10 Mar (TANJUG)—The Council of Elders of the Islamic Community in Sarajevo issued a statement today in connection with the more frequent armed attacks on religious buildings and appealed to the

world's public, and organizations which can help, to call a halt to, the statement says, this "already open and systematic religious chauvinism."

In the night of 9-10 March a bomb was thrown at a mosque in Banja Luka which damaged the facade of the building and shattered all the windows. Since 26 February when another mosque was attacked in Banja Luka, a mosque in Prnjavor has come under machinegun fire, and another mosque has been attacked in Donji Kamenograd.

The Islamic community did not inform the public about all this in order not to increase tension given the well-known dramatic events. However, the fact that the escalation of vandalism against religious buildings of Muslims has not been ceasing but increasing, especially since the beginning of the Islamic holiday of Ramadan, and the competent organs are doing nothing to discover and bring the perpetrators to court, accompanied by sharp protests, the Council of Elders of the Islamic Community is seeking the protection of the world community.

Council Calls Security Situation 'Critical'

LD1003173292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1336 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 10 March (TANJUG)—The current political and security situation in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is critical; unless the necessary measures are taken immediately, there could be large-scale clashes and civil war, it was assessed at yesterday's session of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to a statement today.

It is vital, today's statement stresses, that the competent state organs and institutions insure the functioning of the law-governed state, or rather of constitutionality and legality. Priority should be given to resolving the question of the paramilitary formations that exist in all three nations in the republic, the statement says.

It was proposed that a joint session of the Council for All- People's Defense and the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order—expanded to encompass representatives of the Party of Democratic Action, the Serbian Democratic Party, and the Croatian Democratic Community, and officials from the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA)—be held as a matter of urgency. According to the statement, the meeting will also consider the question of the status and transformation of the JNA on the territory of Bosnia- Herzegovina and a proposal will be made to the republican Presidency that it should adopt appropriate decisions. After this, the statement goes on to say, regular recruitment to the army from the whole territory of the republic will be insured, taking into account the national structure of the population in the republic. A JNA transformed in this way would achieve regular, essential, and appropriate cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs to prevent and

frustrate any clashes, and maintain public order and peace and overall security in the republic, the statement says.

Under one of the conclusions reached at the session yesterday, the national parties will take all necessary measures to place all paramilitary formations under joint JNA and Ministry of Internal Affairs control. The council also pointed out that in current circumstances all justice organs should consistently and responsibly execute without delay their task of implementing constitutionality and law in the republic. This implies the need in an emergency procedure to elect and appoint new judicial officials.

On this occasion the council again reiterated the need to depoliticize all state organs at all levels. It is necessary, the statement stresses, to overcome as soon as possible the existing practice whereby the same person can occupy a position in both a political party and in an appropriate state body. In the council's view this is one of the key prerequisites for insuring that the law-governed state functions properly.

In the presence of the minister for internal affairs and his deputy the council considered claims contained in a ministry report concerning the activity of Biljana Plavsic, the council's chairman, during the night that barricades went up in Sarajevo. It was said that the ministry's report, which was quoted by the media, had not been verified by either the minister of internal affairs or his deputy or the ministry's council of experts as required by regulations in this and similar cases.

Metalworkers Call for Government To Step Down

AU1103110792 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] The republican committee of metalworkers of Bosnia-Herzegovina stated today that the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina has done nothing to fulfill the obligations that it undertook after June's strike by metal workers and that it had submitted a demand for the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina to replace the government by 30 March at the latest. If parliament does not do this, metalworkers will start a general strike on 13 April that will go on until the government is replaced.

Sarajevo Radio, TV Managers Board Resigns

AU1103110092 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] At today's session of the workers' council of the Sarajevo Radio and Television public enterprise, the resignation of the board of managers was accepted and a commission was set up to select new management for Sarajevo Radio and Television. Business, financial, and programming plans for 1992 were partially endorsed. A program of operations and activities was adopted for overcoming the serious material situation in the collective.

280 Kilograms of Explosives Stolen in Visoko

*AU1103113092 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network
in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] The crisis headquarters of the Visoko commune issued a statement this evening which says that 280 kilograms of explosives and 3,000 meters of slow-burning fuse have disappeared from the consignment that was stolen and then returned during its regular passage from Vitez to Serbia. The crisis headquarters of the Visoko commune has asked the responsible organs in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to carry out an urgent investigation.

'Text' of Lisbon Declaration Published

*92BA0592A Zagreb VJESNIK
in Serbo-Croatian 27 Feb 92 p 7*

[Unattributed article from the Croatian News Agency: "The Lisbon Declaration on the Constitutional Arrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[Text] Sarajevo—We are publishing the text of the declaration on the principles of the new constitutional arrangement for Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H], which we received from the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] for B-H and which the conference on Yugoslavia offered to the participants in the talks in Lisbon, that is, to representatives of the B-H political parties: the SDA [Democratic Action Party], the HDZ, and the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party]. Resumption of the talks with the same participants has been announced for Thursday, 27 February, in Sarajevo.

A. Independence

1. After obtaining independence, Bosnia-Herzegovina will be an independent federal state consisting of three constituent states, to be called either regions or provinces.
2. Bosnia-Herzegovina will retain its present borders, and neither the federal government nor the governments of its constituent states will encourage nor support claims to any part of its territory by neighboring states.
3. The members of all three nationalities, Muslim, Serbs, and Croats, and also members of other nationalities and ethnic minorities, will exercise their sovereign rights through the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the states which they create.

B. General Principles

1. Bosnia-Herzegovina and the states which comprise it are to be governed in compliance with the following constitutional principles, as those principles are understood and generally enforced in the democratic states of West Europe and as set forth in the Draft Convention which is now being debated in this conference:

- a. Respect for human rights as the highest standards envisaged in the Draft Convention, respect for private property, a market economy, and free enterprise;
- b. The universal and equal right to vote, free elections, and the secret ballot;
- c. Freedom of political and trade union activity;
- d. A secular system of government with full freedom of religion and separation of church and state, separation of the powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, respect for the law, and an effective democratic system and oversight over constitutionality and legality and protection of constitution and legality;
- e. International supervision and jurisdiction over protection of human rights and liberties.

C. The Assembly and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1. The Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina shall consist of the directly elected Citizens' Chamber and the States Chamber, in which each of the three constituent states have an equal number of representatives.
2. The Assembly and Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina will possess legislative and administrative jurisdiction in the following sectors: armed forces, economic relations, including transportation, fuel and energy, oil pipelines and water management, insofar as any of these sectors involve more than one of the constituent states, and also other areas to be decided later. Decisions on the flag and crest, the schools and religious affairs, decisions related to relations with neighboring states, and the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina are to be made in the States Chamber by a three-fourths majority of the total number of representatives in the Chamber.
3. The personnel of the government administration, the courts, and the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina are to reflect the proportions of the ethnic composition of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4. A separate Constitutional Court is to be established to resolve constitutional issues between the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the governments of the states comprising Bosnia-Herzegovina; for a period of at least five years, its members will include a disinterested element neither from Bosnia-Herzegovina nor from neighboring states.

D. The Constituent States of B-H

1. Three constituent states are to be formed within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their territory is defined in Section E of this text.
2. The assembly and government of the constituent states will have authority, subject to legislation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in all matters of legislative and

administrative interest to the constituent states. This applies to the following areas:

- administrative agencies and personnel of the constituent state;
- confiscation of real estate for public use;
- land records department;
- fire fighting;
- economic chamber;
- supervision over cooperative organizations in commerce;
- social security;
- health insurance;
- preservation of the historical, artistic, and historical [sic] legacy;
- cultural institutions, such as libraries, institutes, and museums;
- land use;
- environmental supervision;
- housing affairs;
- market affairs;
- the highway network;
- protection against natural disasters;
- mining;
- fishing and hunting;
- natural areas protected by law;
- water supply system;
- pipeline network;
- transportation within the constituent state;
- police;
- commerce;
- security in public gatherings;
- hygiene;
- athletics and recreation, and other sectors to be decided.

3. Government administration, police, local courts, and any national guard that would be established by the constituent state will adhere to the ethnic composition of the constituent state.

4. Members of an ethnic group which constitute a minority in any of the constituent states will be similarly protected as provided in Article 2, subparagraph 3 of the Draft Convention.

5. There shall be absolute right of freedom of movement from one constituent state to another and between sections of the same constituent state.

E. Definition of the Constituent States

1. The territory of the constituent state will be determined on the basis of the 1981 Population Census and the existing opcinas, with only those small adjustments which are obviously justified, which would be done in such a way that the opcinas in which a particular ethnic group is obviously in the majority would be grouped in the respective constituent state. A state may consist of several detached sections. If in any area difficulties in territorial definition are not altogether resolved, help will be requested from the Arbitration Commission.

Sarajevo will be a separate territorial unit under administration of the federal government.

F. Transitional Provisions

1. The constitutional law that would modify the Constitution (of B-H) in order to implement these principles will be prepared and submitted for consideration of the Assembly (of B-H) in the shortest possible time.

Bosnian HDZ Comments on Declaration

92BA0592B Zagreb VJESNIK
in Serbo-Croatian 27 Feb 92 p 7

[Unattributed article from Croatian News Agency: "Objections of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Lisbon Declaration"]

[Text] Sarajevo—On the eve of resumption of the talks on the principles of the new constitutional arrangement for Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H], which, it has been announced, will be held on Thursday, 27 February, in Sarajevo, among representatives of the SDA [Democratic Action Party], the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of B-H, and the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] of B-H, the Croatian Democratic Community of B-H has sent to the Secretariat of the Conference on Yugoslavia in Brussels a letter to be delivered into the hands of Jose Cutilheiro, which was signed by Mate Boban, vice president of the HDZ of B-H, containing objections and suggestions for the text of the Declaration on Principles of the New Constitutional System for Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are publishing the objections and proposals of the HDZ of B-H in their entirety:

Following delivery of the text of the Declaration on Principles of the New Constitutional System for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina presents to you with deep respect the following objections and proposals:

A. Independence

1. Following international recognition, Bosnia-Herzegovina will be independent as a state community of three constituent and sovereign nationalities in their respective state areas.

2. No objection.

3. The members of the three nationalities, Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, will exercise their sovereign rights directly in the constituent units of the State Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and through the State Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as set forth in the constitutional act of its establishment.

B. General Principles

1. Authority will be arranged in the State Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its constituent state areas in keeping with the following principles:

A, B, C, D, and E. No objection.

C. Assembly and Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1. No objection.

2. The area of competence (jurisdiction) of the Assembly of the State Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of its other agencies, and also the manner of decision-making in them, will be established by the constitutional act to be enacted with consent of the representatives of the three constituent and sovereign nationalities.

3. The personnel of government administration, the courts, and armed forces of the State Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina will reflect the proportions of the ethnic composition of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4. In order to resolve conflicts concerning rights and duties between the governments of the constituent state units and the Government of the State Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a court will be established whose members may include for a period of at least five years a disinterested element not from Bosnia-Herzegovina or from any neighboring state.

D. The Constituent Units of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1. Within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, three constituent state units will be established and their territory defined in Section E of this text.

2. The area of competence (jurisdiction) of the assembly and other bodies of the constituent state units of the State Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be established by the constitutional act establishing the State Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, based on the principle that sovereignty comes originally from them.

3. Administrative departments, the police, the courts, and any national guard that would be established by the constituent unit will reflect the ethnic composition of the constituent unit.

4. No objection.

5. No objection.

E. Definition of the Constituent Units

1. Accepted with the objection that the criteria for determining the territories of the constituent units are imprecise.

F. Transitional Provisions

1. The constitutional agreement of the three constituent and sovereign nationalities, which is enacted on the basis of unanimity of the delegations of the three constituent nationalities, will be prepared and submitted for consideration to the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the shortest possible time.

Foreign 'Mercenaries' Volunteer To Fight

92BA0605D Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 27 Feb 92 p 11

[Article by M. Milutinovic: "Foreign Mercenaries Would Go to Bosnia-Herzegovina: Dogs of War Get Wind of Sarajevo"—first paragraph is NARODNA ARMIJA introduction]

[Text] Over the past two months, more than 10 organized groups have been turned back from the Yugoslav border, consisting of Islamic soldiers of fortune from Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Libya, Morocco.... Four groups were captured and brought in only after making it into Kosovo, and the possibility cannot be ruled out that individuals have made it to their destination.

The trip by Izetbegovic, Cengic, and other Muslim leaders of B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] to Turkey and other Islamic countries stirred up public opinion in those countries concerning the threat to the Muslim population in Yugoslavia and consolidated the conviction that they must help defend Islam. This is why it comes as no surprise that the official Turkish and Libyan governments and other circles in Islamic countries have promised direct military aid to defend the sovereignty of the Muslim nation, whereby they were probably thinking—because this is how the situation was presented to them—that the Muslim nation is the only one living in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The overloaded Bosnian stewpot could explode before long if the pressure is not released, which would be disastrous for the entire population. Many people are aware of this, but continue to work solely on achieving their goals and plans. The recognition of a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina by Turkey and Bulgaria only added fuel to the inflamed political scene. Encouraged by foreign support, the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and its leaders were even more determined to hold the referendum and proclaim the desired results, instead of fighting to stabilize overall conditions.

It is known now that the Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak, headed by Sulejman Ugljanin, and the Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo, headed by Numan Balic, have developed an entire network of activities for providing direct assistance in the upcoming referendum and armed support to the supposedly threatened Muslim population in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Very much involved in this work is the former, at least nominal vice president of the Yugoslav Assembly, Irfan Ajanovic. His activity is directed towards registering Muslims from Sandzak and Kosmet in certain localities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order that they are able to vote for a sovereign and independent republic.

Aid to the "Threatened" Muslim Brothers

We are also witnessing the formation of numerous paramilitary formations, through which the national parties want to guard against any sort of surprise. The

arming of party units and groups and their arrogant behavior are greatly complicating the situation and sowing fear and doubt among the residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have learned from confidential sources that during their visits to certain Islamic countries, certain SDA leaders even requested military aid in order to defend the allegedly threatened Muslim population.

Their visits were followed by strong propaganda activity by the media in those countries, which created the proper mood of public opinion through which volunteers were sought—experienced soldiers to help the threatened Muslim brothers in Yugoslavia. Over the past two months, more than 10 organized groups have been turned back from the Yugoslav border, consisting of potential mercenaries from Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Libya, and Morocco who were attempting to make their way into Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thanks to the responsible work of Yugoslav border officials, they were not allowed to enter the country.

Turks, Moroccans, Libyans....

After Turkey's recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the decision by the Party of Democratic Action to hold the referendum, and the assumption of border-control functions by Macedonian institutions, attempts by Islamic dogs of war to enter Bosnia-Herzegovina became more frequent. This is evidenced in part by four captured groups brought in by organs of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Serbia.

A group of 10 foreign nationals was caught on a bus on the Skopje-Pristina route on 28 January, none of whom had documents for entry into Yugoslavia in their possession. After questioning, it was determined that this group consisted of eight Moroccans, one Syrian, and one Palestinian. They had managed to cross illegally from Bulgaria into Macedonian territory and, according to their statements, they were headed for jobs in Sarajevo.

On 4 February, the competent organs brought 10 Turkish nationals, five Moroccan nationals, and two Libyans who did not have the proper entry visas for Yugoslavia into the Urosevac Security Center. During questioning—probably not realizing with whom they were speaking—they said that they were going to Bosnia-Herzegovina to fight against the Serbs there.

A similar group was discovered by the MUP of Serbia on 5 February at a control point in Kacanik. This group consisted of 10 Moroccans, who said during questioning that they were going to Bosnia to "help their Muslim brothers in the struggle with the Serbs."

On several occasions, Turkish, Moroccan, Syrian, Palestinian, and Libyan nationals have been detained individually and sent back because they did not have the proper travel documents. Bearing in mind the support of the Islamic world for the B-H government, the possibility cannot be ruled out that a significant number of them have made it to Bosnia-Herzegovina and that they are preparing for organized, armed conflict.

Experience and the latest events in Croatia have shown that a large number of foreign mercenaries have been the exponents of criminal activities against the Serbian population. This must worry the entire Bosnia-Herzegovian public and point to the threat to peace and stability in the territory of the republic. This all the more so since it has been learned from well-informed sources that Albanian and Arab students in Sarajevo have already been signed up for the purpose of involvement in any armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Knowing that soldiers of fortune who come from Islamic countries are members of numerous Islamic fundamentalist organizations and that they do not know the language spoken by Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, it is possible that these extremists could also direct their activities against the Muslim population itself. It is forgotten that there are no ethnically pure principles for the Muslim population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that there is a great deal of intermingling between the three nations, so that any sort of involvement by foreign mercenaries could catastrophically complicate the situation.

Whatever the case, the involvement of foreign mercenaries in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the scriptwriters imagine it, cannot offer the conditions for a democratic resolution of the crisis. On the contrary, it could seriously threaten the already fragile peace and stability in that republic.

Croatia

Tudjman Comments on Brussels Conference

*LD1003210292 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1825 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Radio and television statement by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on return to Zagreb from Brussels conference on 10 March—recorded]

[Text] It can be said that the Brussels conference on resolving the crisis in former Yugoslavia has entered at least a new stage, if not its final one. The conference yesterday was chaired by Mr. Carrington in the presence of Mr. Vance. Mr. Carrington reviewed the history of the crisis in Yugoslavia, especially the war conflict, and also the history of the work of the conference itself, first in The Hague and then in Brussels. He mentioned in passing [changes thought] I think it was very significant that he referred to the exacerbation of the tension, to those who were behind the aggression, i.e. the Yugoslav army and Serbia, and that he made special reference to the aggressor's barbaric behavior reflected in the destruction of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. He also said that in the efforts to find solutions to the crisis the point of departure must be the principle that no borders can be changed by force, and that those who count on different developments are mistaken.

Mr. Carrington further said that the conference will have to focus attention on the following five issues: first, economic relations on the territory of former Yugoslavia; [second] the problem of human and civil rights; third, the issue of a special status for the minorities. In this context he referred to the problems of all minorities on the territory of former Yugoslavia, from Croatia and Serbs in Croatia to the Albanians in Kosovo. Fourth, as a special issue, the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and fifth, the problem of succession in former Yugoslavia. In other words, the division of assets and all that emerges from the process of the disappearance of a state. In this context the departure point was the European arbitration commission's standpoint that former Yugoslavia is a country in disintegration and that the current period should be devoted to efforts to resolve all problems surrounding the succession.

Mr. Carrington said that he will appoint a special representative, or envoy, who will devote himself to the problem of succession, coordinate the efforts of the working groups set up so far within the European conference framework, and search for solutions to these issues.

This is what is most important. The conference took place in light of a decision to send UN peace forces and of indications that the United States has already made a decision to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. As far as I can see, it is only a question of time before the decision is announced. It is not unlikely that this decision will be announced in Brussels today. It seemed that the problem was whether this time the United States would succeed in persuading all EC countries to simultaneously recognize all four republics, in other words, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in addition to Croatia and Slovenia. The problem appeared to be Macedonia, due to resistance on the part of Greece.

It should be noted, especially in view of the fact that wrong interpretations sometimes circulate among the public, that neither at the conference in The Hague nor in Brussels was a document signed, and that discussions were only conducted in principle. No document has ever been signed even about the deployment of peace forces. Discussions were conducted in principle alone, and agreements were reached and stands coordinated on fundamental issues.

It is clear that of the open issues to be resolved, the most important is the problem of how to resolve the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The burden of the crisis on the territory of former Yugoslavia has now been transferred to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is important to note in this context that the EC is now also proceeding from the view that the borders should not be questioned; that an agreement must be reached between all three nations living in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and that once these three nations have arrived at a

solution, efforts will have to be made to regulate relations between the three nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and with their neighboring countries.

It is very significant that as far as the issue of succession is concerned, Serbia and Montenegro continued to advocate one view; that is, they wish to be the successor of former Yugoslavia. All four other republics rejected this since, in their view, there are no reasons, either legal or historical, why one or two states, in this case Serbia and Montenegro, should be the successor even if they decide not to declare their independence or decide to set up a new Yugoslav state. All other republics have rejected this and it seems that international factors advocate the same view on the basis of international law and practice in the world.

Serbia's Plans To Draw Croatia Into New War

92BA0605B Zagreb VJESNIK
in Serbo-Croatian 28 Feb 92 p 5

[Commentary by Aleksandar Milosevic: "Monkey Wrench in UN Plan"]

[Text] Is it possible that the UN peacekeeping forces will not come to this region after all? The vast political, as well as military, machinery of that world organization has been set in motion, and it appears almost certain that the first blue helmets will arrive in Croatia in two or three weeks. In the history of UN peacekeeping actions, there are no cases where the sending in of blue helmets was postponed at the last minute, but this does not mean that a new precedent could not be set.

The fierce attacks along lines of the cease-fire in Slavonia, Kordun, Lika, and Dalmatia show that these are not merely arbitrary raids by local commanders, but rather a premeditated plan for drawing Croatia into a new, open military conflict.

Evidence of such plans by the Milosevic regime is provided by the deployment of new troops and by the fortification of positions in these areas, which according to the UN peace plan should be demilitarized in the initial period. On the "Voice of Petrova Gora" radio station, Mile Paspalj, the president of the phantom assembly of the "republic of Serbian Krajina," has asserted that the Serbian nation "will not and cannot reconcile itself with Osijek, Sisak, Gospić, and Karlovac being Croatian cities," and that they will "demand dual administration and government in those areas." Objections to the effect that one should not give too much attention to statements made on such a fringe radio station and by such a fringe politician fall away when one notes that the regime in Belgrade has always made use of fringe figures to proclaim its plans and desires.

Specifically, it is clear that given the preparations and agreements that have been effected thus far, the arrival of UN peacekeeping forces in these regions would be seriously jeopardized by new military confrontations. The world organization has a mandate to send troops to

war neither from the General Assembly, or rather the Security Council, nor from the countries whose units would have to be sent into these regions. This is obviously the card that Milosevic and the military leadership are playing while at the same time attempting to present themselves to the world as unconditional supporters of the arrival of the blue helmets.

If Croatia were to accept open military confrontation, then Milosevic's propaganda machinery would try to depict Croatia to the entire world or at least to politically relevant milieus as the side that began the war and the one responsible for blocking the arrival of the peacekeeping forces in these areas. This sort of thing is vaguely discernible in the letter by Borisav Jovic recently sent to UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali. At one point, Jovic calls on Ghali and the world organization to "send in peacekeeping forces as soon as possible, because the cease-fire has been seriously jeopardized since Croatia is violating provisions of the Sarajevo agreement." Naturally, it is difficult for Jovic to substantiate such an allegation, all the more so since liaison officers and European observers themselves have often witnessed violations of the cease-fire by the Serbian side. But Belgrade is speculating that with a strong propaganda campaign, a revival of wartime chaos would shift if not all of the blame, then at least part of it, to the Croatian side.

The question that arises is why Belgrade is trying to prevent the arrival of peacekeeping forces. There are several reasons for this. At the present time of increasing opposition to the Milosevic regime, the Serbian leader obviously believes that new military confrontations would postpone for a certain time an outcome that is disadvantageous to his regime. Once again, an attempt would be made to marginalize the opposition by appealing to pan-Serbian unity and a continuation of the war which is "again forced on Serbia...."

The second reason is the possibility that a flareup of new military conflict and the attempt to shift the blame to Croatia would at least partially secure legality for a change in borders and international legality for the so-called republic of Serbian Krajina. The regime in Belgrade is also counting on the possibility that the world organization, but also political public opinion, could be fed up with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and could adopt a hands-off approach to this region, thus turning the military and political solution over to the republics and nations of the former Yugoslavia. It is hard to believe that the world organization would in fact do something like that, but the regime in Belgrade is obviously counting on that possibility.

It is precisely because of the obviously efforts by Belgrade to draw Croatia back into military conflict that such a possibility must at the same time be averted politically and diplomatically, but also militarily. It would be a good thing to invite EC and UN observers and liaison officers to all the crisis regions as soon as possible, primarily those that are under military attack

every day, in order that they can continue to see who is disrupting the cease-fire, and to what extent. At the same time, Croatia should resolutely and clearly let it be known to the world organization, but also to the other side, that it will not tolerate provocations indefinitely, whereby it releases itself from all responsibility for the possible failure of the peacekeeping mission, which was in fact launched by Croatia. Croatia has demonstrated both good will and the political desire to resolve all political issues peacefully and without weapons, but also the determination not to allow a single additional inch of Croatian soil to be occupied.

Diplomatic Ties With Belgium Established

LD1003182492 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Croatia was signed today. The important agreement was signed by ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium in Bern and special envoy of the Belgian Foreign Minister Roland Barny and Deputy Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs Bozidar Gagro.

Colombia Delivers Recognition Announcement

LD1003230592 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] The Republic of Colombia has recognized Croatia. An announcement to this effect was delivered to Zvonimir Separovic, foreign minister of the Republic of Croatia, by Mr. Ivo Rojnica, plenipotentiary representative of Croatia in Argentina. According to the Colombian ambassador in Buenos Aires, the decision to recognize Croatia was made on 3 March. Colombia is the third largest country in South America.

Krajina Awaiting UN Peacekeeping Force

92BA0583D Belgrade POLITIKA
in Serbo-Croatian 25 Feb 92 p 7

[Article by M. Cetnik: "A Welcome in the Midst of Political Struggle"]

[Text] Knin, 24 Feb—The beauties of the night and gamblers are sitting at the green felt table and studying *Engleski u sto lekcija* (*English in 100 Lessons*). This report half in jest usually explains the situation at the moment in the krajina, where they are waiting for nearly 14,000 soldiers of the United Nations. This observation is authentically illustrated by the fact that the "marginals" and private sector are mainly preparing to welcome the "blue helmets." This applies most of all to those who run restaurants and cafes, who—while waiting for the dollar cake—have pretty well filled their pockets with Topcider currency thanks to the generous salaries of the soldiers and the preoccupation with the krajina's "bar

culture." In one bar in Lika, it is said, mattresses are all ready for the blue warriors to enjoy the pleasures of this world.

And while the civilian population has been attempting a bit confusedly to get a handle on the new mental situation and adapt to it in good time, the krajina princes are trying the cheapest tricks to get their hands on the political scepter. Parties and individuals who left the krajina during wartime and did very well for themselves in the capital are hypocritically selling worn-out political goods in a new wrapping and aggressively grasping for the reins of power. At the same time, the current opstina officials are trying to consolidate their positions, driving away those who do not think like them by the method of the political witch-hunt. The only move that has been made, and it was merely on paper, was by the Benkovac administration, which formed an opstina commission for cooperation with the United Nations. The other opstina leaders in the southern part of the krajina are not saying a word and not convening the opstina assemblies, presumably trying to avoid embarrassing questions from the deputies. In some opstinas, Gracac, for example, they do not even know whether and how government services and the local government apparatus are operating.

It is well-known that preparations have gone furthest in the institutions and services of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], but the proverbially "conspiratorial" army conceals its activities from the eyes of the public. Nevertheless, it is no secret that structures are being built and adapted to receive the soldiers with the blue helmets.

Preparations have been made on time and effectively only by banks from Serbia, especially "Beobanka," which has opened several offices and branches in the urban settlements on the fringe where it is expected that the peacekeeping troops will be stationed. Judging, however, by last night's statements by the chief of the UN observer mission, Colonel John Wilson—to the effect that the stereotypes already created concerning the "blues" as rowdy lads whose dollars are falling out of their pockets are not in accord with reality.

Macedonia

Greek Plane Violates Airspace Near Prespa

AU1003153392 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA
in Macedonian 2 Mar 92 p 3

[G.G. report: "Greek Planes Over Prespa"]

[Text] Resen, 1 March—For the second time in the last four days, Macedonian airspace was violated on two occasions today by a Greek airplane on the Resen part of the Macedonian-Greek border at the village of Dolno Dupeni. According to information from the Resen airspace observers, at 1040 [0940 GMT] this morning the plane flew from the Greek side and remained 5 kilometers in our territory at Crveni Steni. Then, at 1345 probably the same or a similar plane illegally entered

more than 2 kilometers into our airspace at the place called Cuce. On the two occasions, once it had flown over the village of Ljubojno and the surrounding area at a height of 3,000 to 4,000 meters the plane returned again. The flights by the Greek plane or planes were noticed by the responsible militia and army organs at the border, as well as by numerous eye witnesses in the villages in the Prespa region, but no other measures are being taken. This is yet another provocation by our southern neighbors and it is surprising that it happened only one day after the emergency session of the local mixed Macedonian-Greek commission for border incidents which was held to discuss the violation of our airspace by a Greek plane on 27 February.

Army Facilities Transferred to Defense Ministry

LD1003213992 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1429 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] Skopje, 10 Mar (TANJUG)—A number of Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] garrisons, commands, storage depots, watch-towers, and other military facilities on the territory of Macedonia have been handed over to the republic's Defense Ministry, Macedonia's Information Ministry announced today.

The transfer of the JNA facilities has come about as a result of an agreement between Colonel General Blagoje Adzic, chief of the JNA general staff, and Kiro Gligorov, president of Macedonia. The Macedonian Ministry of Defense and the command of the Third Army District set the deadline for the completion of the transfer and agreed that the JNA should withdraw from Macedonia by 15 April.

The Information Ministry stresses in its statement that the JNA facilities are currently being guarded by members of the Macedonian territorial defense. The citizens of Macedonia are urged to take this into account and to establish the necessary cooperation with the territorial defense representatives.

Serbia

Belgrade Students Stage Protest Gathering

LD1103092892 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 0818 GMT 11 Mar 92

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 11 Mar (TANJUG)—A protest meeting by Belgrade students which began last night continues today on Terazije Square. The meeting was organized to mark the March 1991 "Velvet Revolution".

The number of students at Terazije now has dwindled to about 200 to 300 from several thousand last night. The students insist on their three demands being fulfilled: the resignation of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, new elections for a constitutive assembly, and an end to political monopoly of the media. [passage omitted]

The Terazije meeting has been proceeding without incident. Like last year, Belgrade's taxi drivers and citizens have been delivering food, tea, and coffee to the students.

Kosovars To Hold Multiparty Elections

AU1003092892 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1830 GMT 9 Mar 92

[Text] As Radio Croatia reports, a meeting of the Kosovo Democratic Alliance's Central Council conducted by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova decided to organize free multiparty elections in the Republic of Kosovo as soon as possible. He based this decision on the political mood of the membership and the duties stemming from last September's referendum on Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state. It was considered that this politically important question should also be examined by Albanian Interparty Coordinating Council, and that the Assembly and Government of the Republic of Kosovo should be asked to take the relevant steps to create the legal and constitutional preconditions for holding these elections. The assembly, the government, and the political parties must in the meantime commit themselves to publicizing these elections abroad. The government, deputies and international organizations must ensure international supervision and as many observers as possible.

'Unfounded' Hungarian Concerns Viewed

LD1103104392 Belgrade TANJUG in English
0734 GMT 11 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, March 11 (TANJUG)—Since the disintegration of Yugoslavia gained impetus, official Budapest has increasingly voiced its concern for the allegedly endangered rights of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina, the northern province of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia.

It is wholeheartedly helped by certain Vojvodina opposition leaders, who claim that Hungarians do not enjoy all human rights other minorities in Europe do. The campaign was launched by the democratic community of Vojvodina's Hungarians (DZVM) and its leader Andras Agoston, and enjoys the support of some Serbian opposition parties as well.

All Hungarians do not, however, agree with the campaign. The "Association of Hungarians for the Fatherland of Serbia and Yugoslavia" for instance, maintains that these requests for greater rights conceal political and territorial aspirations. Hungarian Foreign Minister Jeszensky's strategic plan, they warn, is "to win over the opposition parties in Serbia in order to overthrow the current government in Serbia, on the one hand, and to win over collaborators for Hungarian territorial claims on the other."

Hungary's ample help to the Yugoslav secessionist republic of Croatia is proof that Budapest's concern for

its minority in Vojvodina is motivated by other things as well. Arms were delivered to Croatia from its territory, and centers for training saboteurs of the Croatian paramilitary formations have been set up in the border regions.

Minister Jeszensky qualified the transportation of 20,000 "Kalashnikovs" to Croatia through Hungary in the autumn of 1990 as a "technical-administrative mistake," but Hungary's aid and various forms of support, including the Croatian para-military forces' use of Hungarian territory, continued after the "Kalashnikov" scandal.

Head of the NATO parliamentary delegation Javier Ruperez also noticed that various games were played in and around Vojvodina. After his recent visit to the province, he told the local representatives that "there are many who do not want to live together."

Hungarians account for 350,000 of Vojvodina's 2 million multi-national population. Contrary to what certain Hungarian politicians claim, they are enabled to attend schools in their mother tongue from elementary education to the university.

Statistics say that, in addition to the Serbian language, Hungarian is officially used in 29 out of 45 Vojvodina communes. Twelve communes officially use Slovak, nine use Romanian, six use Ruthenian and one uses Czech.

Ethnic Hungarians and other minorities in Vojvodina have their own theaters, publishing houses, folklore societies, press, tv and radio broadcasts, which is not less, but more than ethnic minorities in many European countries enjoy.

The background of Budapest's unfounded concern for the status of Hungarians in Serbia has also been clarified by the recent statements of Hungarian high officials, including the foreign and prime ministers, that "Vojvodina was never a part of Serbia, but of Yugoslavia" and that the "disintegration of the Yugoslav state poses the question of the future status of this province."

What is in question is the failure to recognize or the attempt to forge the obvious historical fact that, after Serbia won the war against Austro-Hungary (1914-1918), the Slav majority in Vojvodina reached an agreement on November 25, 1918, to join the Kingdom of Serbia. This happened before Yugoslavia was founded (on December 1, 1918).

Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase also recently confirmed that something else lies behind Budapest's concern for its fellow countrymen in the neighboring countries when he said that "Hungary again uses the alleged disrespect of the Hungarian minority's rights in Romania as a screen for its territorial revisionism."

Slovakia, Hungary's northern neighbor, also recently expressed its concern for Budapest's increasingly frequent assessments that this border was not a happy solution either.

Slovenia

Diplomatic Relations Established With Albania

LD1003193692 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1839 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] Ljubljana, 10 Mar (TANJUG)—Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, Slovenian minister of foreign affairs, and Ilir Bocha, Albanian minister of foreign affairs, signed an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two Republics in Ljubljana today.

At a news conference after the talks, Bocha expressed "satisfaction with the attitude of the Slovenian authorities toward Albanians in Slovenia."

In today's talks it was agreed that Slovenia will administer its interests in Albania via its embassy in Rome while Albania will administer its interests in Slovenia via its embassy in Vienna.

Deputy Premier Assesses Results of Iran Visit

LD1003221592 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1731 GMT 10 Mar 92

[Text] Ljubljana, 10 Mar (TANJUG)—Slovenia and Iran will soon establish diplomatic relations thereby creating more favorable conditions for further political, economic, business, and other forms of reciprocal cooperation.

This was stressed by Slovene Deputy Premier Dr. Andrej Ocvirk at a news conference in Ljubljana today following the return of a Slovene delegation from a several-day visit to Iran. The representatives of Slovenia and Iran have agreed to open a Tehran-Ljubljana air route. In addition, a positive answer is expected to an offer to buy 500,000 tonnes of crude oil in Iran for convertible currency. Provided all necessary conditions have been fulfilled, it is planned that the oil will be processed in Croatia or in a neighboring country.

Slovene businessmen believe that exports to Iran, which amounted to \$36 million last year, could even be doubled this year. The great interest in comprehensive economic and general business cooperation with Iran is apparently based on the conviction prevalent in some Slovene quarters that as an independent country Slovenia can assume the role of middle-man between the Islamic Republic and part of Western Europe.

In Iran, the Slovene Government delegation also discussed the possibility of Slovenia acquiring guest status in the nonaligned movement, current events in Yugoslavia, and the demand that Slovene companies be taken off the list of firms with which future business contacts could be risky. Slovene Deputy Premier Dr. Andrej

Ocvirk said that the people they talked to in Iran were told that Slovenia will soon recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Ministry Reviews Slovene Foreign Policy

92BA0579B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 22 Feb 92 p 4

[Article by Romana Dobnikar-Seruga: "Getting Rid of the Burden of the SFRY and Joining Europe as Soon as Possible"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] New document on Slovene foreign policy; Dr. Rupel: the egocentric phase of foreign policy is over; in addition to the issues of state legal succession, an agreement with the EC is the most important.

Ljubljana, 21 Feb—The first versions of the Foreign Ministry's report on last year, and the starting points for the Slovene Republic's foreign policy activity following its international recognition, two fundamental and rather extensive foreign policy documents, which the deputies in the republic's Assembly are to discuss as early as 5 or 6 March, were discussed today by the members of the Council on Foreign Affairs and the Council for Foreign Economic Relations at the Foreign Ministry.

With international recognition, the egocentric phase of foreign policy is behind us, and we are now stepping unprotected into the European draft. During this period, we should ensure possibilities for Slovenia's development, for economic revival and prosperity, and for preserving the people's cultural identity. Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel stated in his address. He enumerated the most important foreign policy tasks in the coming period: concluding an agreement with the EC on associate membership, membership in the Council of Europe, the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], and the UN, multilateral security cooperation in the European area, regulating relations with the neighboring states and minority issues, settling succession issues (state legal succession to the SFRY), and several tasks in the area of foreign trade.

During the discussion, most of the members of both councils praised the quality of the materials, and added several suggestions for changes and additions:

On the Security Aspects of Foreign Policy

In Dr. Anton Bebler's opinion, they are poorly covered in the materials, since, for instance, no relationship is defined with respect to NATO, the West European Union, neutrality and nonalignment, the possibility of bilateral cooperation in this field, the blue helmets in Croatia—in short, one cannot find an answer to the question of what Slovenia's contribution to the European security system will be like. He also proposed establishing a National Security Council, which is not possible under the constitution, as Dr. Rupel explained.

On Issues of Succession and Relations With the Former Yugoslav Republics

As Dr. Danilo Turk emphasized, it is necessary to stand by our principled position on the equality of all legal successors. It is encouraging that in the United States, according to our information, there is no decisive support for the idea that Serbia and Montenegro should have priority in succession. In resolving these issues, the government has to ensure as much coordination as possible among the ministries, possibly by establishing a separate body. Our goal is a just and reasonable resolution of the succession issues, Dr. Anton Bebler emphasized. He praised the formulation that Slovenia had to be neutral in the conflicts between Croatia and Serbia. Radko Mocivnik was only surprised that the material mentions Tanzania, for example, but Serbia's name does not appear at all. In his opinion, it is necessary to differentiate relations with new states on the territory of the former SFRY, since they will have great importance for us. The level of relations among the republics is so low that there are no possibilities for higher forms of relations, Dr. Mirjan Skrk thought. According to Dr. Tone Hrastelj, the question is whether, if we start from zero, we will achieve integration that will be something more than a free trade zone.

On Membership in the UN

It will occur; there are only certain formal obstacles. According to the most optimistic scenario, we should apply for it as early as April, after acceptance for membership in the CSCE and recognition by the United States.

On Relations With the EC

An agreement on associate membership involves the kind of model that has already been used in the cases of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. The fear that Slovenia would lose its former privileges in trade with the EC is unnecessary, since in the beginning the present asymmetry will be preserved. The main problem will be that it will be necessary to adjust to a unified market within a specified period (from seven to eight, or possibly from six to eight years). The participants in the discussion pointed out that the talks with the EC and EFTA [European Free Trade Association] have to be coordinated, and that we have to take into account the possibility that the EC would want to conclude a "sui generis" agreement with all of the former Yugoslav republics, in which case Slovenia would lose the privileges that it has already gained (Dr. Turk). It is important

that extensions of the present situation not be forced upon us; we should therefore not wait until May to start the negotiations, Bogdan Osolnik thought. It is necessary to preserve the privileges provided by the agreement between the SFRY and the EC, and to expand them further through an agreement on associate membership (Dr. Hrastelj, Dr. Marjan Svetlicic).

On Foreign Economic Relations

Demanding customers are the best basis for a sound development strategy, and consequently the idea that we could compensate for the loss of the Yugoslav markets with East European ones is dangerous and unrealistic. Europe is justifiably our first priority, but we must not be blindly infatuated with it. Diversification would also be undoubtedly useful, since the proportion of trade with the EC is already quite high. It is particularly necessary to seek relations with the world's technological leaders.

Republic Prepared for Economic Cooperation

*LD1003121192 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1138 GMT 10 Mar 92*

[Text] Belgrade, March 10 (TANJUG)—Slovenia is ready for good economic relations with Serbia and other Yugoslav republics, stated Dimitrij Rupel, foreign minister of this secessionist Yugoslav republic.

Whether this will be achieved, according to Rupel, depended also on the other side, as carried by Belgrade daily BORBA on Tuesday. He added that Slovenia has already signed trade agreements with Croatia and Macedonia and stated the hope that such agreements would soon be signed with other Yugoslav republics.

Rupel urged a sort of "free trade zone on the territory of former Yugoslavia," but strongly opposed a customs union.

"We now await Serbia's move," he said.

Prior to seceding from Yugoslavia in June last year, Slovenia was the most developed Yugoslav republic. Croatia, too, seceded from Yugoslavia through a unilateral act, also in June 1991.

The Social Democratic opposition party (SDP) in Slovenia warned on Monday that this republic "faced an economic and social collapse."

This was illustrated with the examples that many families in Slovenia were not capable of obtaining sufficient foodstuffs. Also, the free trade union announced a general strike of warning on March 18.